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We hear much about the “crisis” in legal education:1 high tuition costs, steep
declines in law school enrollment, 2 and graduates who are unprepared for
practice and unable to find jobs. Although the legal profession experienced the

1. JAMES E. MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN CRISIS: RESISTANCE AND
RESPONSES TO CHANGE 1 (2013) (arguing that the legal profession faces a crisis “every decade or
so”); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS x (2012). See Paul Campos, The Crisis of the
American Law School, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 177, 222 (2012) (“The status quo in American
legal education has become unsustainable.”); William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40
PEPP. L. REV. 461, 462 (2013) (indicating that the structural shift in the legal profession requires a
transformative reassessment of the traditional law school curriculum); Kyle P. McEntee et al., The
Crisis in Legal Education: Dabbling in Disaster Planning, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 225, 226‒27
(2012) (discussing the huge nationwide drop in applications to law schools, the inability of
graduates to get jobs, lawsuits against law schools for fraudulent advertising and student
recruitment practices, and stories in leading newspapers and media outlets questioning the value of
a legal education); Lincoln Caplan, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2012, at SR10 (discussing the poor employment prospects of law school graduates and the serious
need for pragmatic changes in legal education); Katherine Mangan, Educators Make the Case for
Going to Law School, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 3, 2014), http://chronicle.com/article/Educators
-Make-the-Case-for/143791 (reporting discussions on the crisis at the 2014 meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools, where it was “acknowledged that times were tough” for law
schools, with total enrollment at its lowest level since 1975, when there were thirty-nine fewer ABA
accredited law schools than today).
2. Between 2010 and 2013, law school applications saw a thirty-eight percent decline with
numbers down to pre-1983 levels. Karen Sloan, Avoiding Law School in Droves: The Number of
Applicants Has Slumped by 20 Percent, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 28, 2013, at 1. In 2014, only twenty-one
of the 201 ABA-accredited schools placed seventy-five percent or more of their graduates in jobs
requiring a law degree. See Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys., Law Jobs: By the
Numbers, EDUCATING TOMORROW’S LAW., http://educatingtomorrowslawyers.du.edu/law-jobs/ca
lculator (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (providing data on each school’s placement statistics). Between
1985 and 2011, the median tuition increased from $3,746 to $19,788 at public schools and from
$15,438 to $39,496 at private schools. See Campos, supra note 1, at 180‒81 (citing ABA data).
The average law school debt of 2012 graduates exceeded $140,000 at twenty law schools, though
at many of these schools, less than half of the graduating class secured jobs requiring a J.D. degree.
See Brian Tamanaha, The Law Graduate Debt Disaster Goes Critical, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 12,
2013, 10:30 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-law-graduate-debt-disaster-goes.html
[hereinafter Tamanaha, Disaster]. The average amount borrowed by law graduates is now
$124,950, up seventy-eight percent from 2002, while the average starting salary has fallen to
$78,653, down sixteen percent from 2009. See id. Yet, even with these new economic realities,
law school may still be a good investment for many. See Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre,
The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 1, 1, 65 tbl.10 (HLS Program on the Legal Profession
Research, Paper No. 2013-6, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2250585 (reporting results of an economic study finding that “given current tuition levels, the
median and even 25th percentile annual earnings premiums justify enrollment. . . . We estimate
the mean pre-tax lifetime value of a law degree [is] approximately [one million dollars].”).
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prequel to this problem during the 1990s, 3 the current predicament is more
severe and symptomatic of a restructuring in the legal services market.4
Many blame law professors for the crisis. Professor Brian Tamanaha, author
of Failing Law Schools,5 asserts that tenured law professors, who seek to serve
their professional and economic interests at the expense of their students’ best
interest, have captured law schools and the American Bar Association’s (ABA)
accrediting process. 6
Such critiques of legal education created a
firestorm,7 though not only in the legal academy. Multiple articles published in

3. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a
Common Sense Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707, 709
(1996) (noting that many critics complain that law schools fail to teach the skills students will need
in law practice).
4. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 168‒71; Campos, supra note 1, at 213; Henderson, supra
note 1, at 462, 479‒89. But see D. Benjamin Barros, Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom on
the Legal Job Market, 1‒2 (Widener Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1360, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258806 (arguing that the current downturn may
not be so different from the downturn in the 1990s).
5. The National Jurist magazine recently named Professor Tamanaha one of the twenty-four
most influential legal educators. Many say that his reform proposals, which much of the public
appears to endorse, will “have an enormous impact . . . on legal education.” TAMANAHA, supra
note 1, at back cover (quoting Professor William Henderson, Indiana Univ. Law School). See also
Symposium, Can Law Schools Prepare Students to be Practice Ready?, 17 CHAPMAN L. REV. 153,
164 (2013) [herineafter CHAPMAN L. REV. SYMP.] (noting that Professor R. Michael Cassidy
believes that Failing Law Schools has “been instrumental in encouraging a lot of the debates we’ve
been having right now” about legal education).
6. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 44‒45.
7. For example, Professor Paul Campos created a blog titled Inside the Law School Scam;
the inaugural post stated that he could “no longer ignore that, for a very large proportion of my
students, law school has become something very much like a scam. . . . [A]t the level of actual
moral responsibility, [it] is that law professors are scamming their students.” Daniel D. Barnhizer,
Cultural Narratives of the Legal Profession: Law School, Scamblogs, Hopelessness, and the Rule
of Law, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 663, 672‒73 (2012). In response, Professor Brian Leiter argued
that Professor Campos
is the failed academic who has done almost no scholarly work in the last decade, teaches
the same courses and seminars year in and year out, and spends his time trying to attract
public attention . . . . [H]e is indeed scamming his students and his state, and his initial
posts were tantamount to a confession that he’s not doing his job.
Id. at 673‒74. See also Anders Walker, Tamanaha’s Response, FACULTY FLOW: A BLOG FOR
ASSOCIATE DEANS (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.slu.edu/colleges/law/slulaw/faculty.flow (posting
that “Tamanaha has written an incendiary book that WILL be read by university presidents,
trustees, and others eager to cut costs, strip faculty resources, and stick it to law professors”).
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the New York Times,8 Wall Street Journal,9 Los Angeles Times,10 National Law
Journal,11 and Forbes12 generated vigorous public debate about the value and
efficacy of legal education, which in turn spurred the establishment of the Law
School Transparency Project.13 Even President Barack Obama weighed in on
the crisis.14 The ABA, in response to the “intense and unprecedented criticism
in national media, blogs, Congress, the courts, and elsewhere” directed at law
schools, 15 formed an emergency task force to address the problem. 16 As
Professor James E. Moliterno observes, “for all the reasons why it’s a bad time
for legal education, it’s a great time to be a legal education reformer.”17
The brief against law professors stems from their demands for increased
faculty sizes and salaries, and their focus on scholarly work, which critics claim
is mostly irrelevant to practitioners and students and only diverts professors from
their teaching responsibilities.18 Law faculties instituted allegedly self-serving
8. Caplan, supra note 1.
9. Ashby Jones & Jennifer Smith, In Rare Step, Law Schools Shrink Faculty, WALL ST. J.,
July 16, 2013, at B1; Joe Palazzolo, Law Grads Face Brutal Job Market, WALL ST. J. (June 25,
2012, 10:18 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304458604577486623469958
142.html; Kaplan Bar Review Survey: 63% of Law School Graduates from the Class of 2013
Believe That Law School Education Can Be Condensed to Two Years, BUSINESS WIRE (Sept. 10,
2013, 8:35 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130910005628/en/Kaplan-BarReview-Survey-63-Law-School#.VPs8OsYd18c [hereinafter Kaplan Bar Review Survey].
10. Jason Song, Faced with Job Complaints, Loyola Law School Accepting Fewer Students,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2013, at A1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/19/local/la-meloyola-law-20130819.
11. Sloan, supra note 2.
12. J. Maureen Henderson, Why Attending Law School Is the Worst Career Decision You’ll
Ever Make, FORBES, June 26, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jmaureenhenderson/2012/06/26/
why-attending-law-school-is-the-worst-career-decision-youll-ever-make/.
13. See LST Details, L. SCH. TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/blog
/about (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (“Law School Transparency is a nonprofit legal education policy
organization dedicated to improving consumer information and to reforming the traditional law
school model.”). See also TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC. 16 (Am. Bar Assoc.,
Working Paper Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/profe
ssional_responsibility/taskforcecomments/aba_task_force_working_paper_august_2013.authchec
kdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE RPT.] (stating that the ABA now requires greater
transparency from law schools).
14. Peter Lattman, Obama Says Law School Should Be 2, Not 3, Years, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24,
2013, at B3 (quoting President Barack Obama’s remarks at a town-hall meeting held at Binghamton
University).
15. See ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at 6‒7.
16. Id. at 1.
17. CHAPMAN L. REV. SYMP., supra note 5, at 158.
18. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 42, 54‒55 (noting that decreased teaching loads and
increased focus on scholarship, which in turn increases tuition costs, may reduce law professors’
commitment to teaching practice-relevant skills to their students); Brent E. Newton, Preaching
What They Don’t Practice: Why Law Faculties’ Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship and
Devaluation of Practical Competencies Obstruct Reform in the Legal Academy, 62 S.C. L. REV.
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practices, such as hiring scholars instead of professionals who can provide
practical lawyering skills training to students.19
Proposals to address the crisis appear to enjoy wide support,20 and, as seen in
the recommendations of the ABA’s Task Force on the Future of Legal
Education, 21 may be poised to change dramatically the landscape of legal
education. Yet, such reforms will harm law students and the legal profession,
placing the legal academy “under erasure,”22 as Jacques Derrida would say, by:
(1) reorienting legal education from an academically-grounded education
toward vocational training; (2) eliminating one year from the traditional threeyear program for the J.D. degree; (3) allowing graduates of non-ABA accredited
law schools to sit for the bar examination, rendering accreditation a toothless
mechanism for ensuring academic quality; and (4) gutting law faculty
scholarship.
The truth is that legal education is broken because it fails to prepare students
for the demands of modern law practice, an industry more complex and
interdisciplinary than ever before. A two-year law degree focusing on practice
skills, as many are now proposing, takes us back nearly a century in time when
law schools were little more than vocational schools.23 Eliminating a full year
of legal education will not better equip law students to be practicing lawyers,
especially considering that today’s three-year program of legal education
produces graduates insufficiently prepared to practice law. Rather, to make the
value of legal education worth its cost, the industry must rethink the purpose of
law schools.
I write from the vantage point of someone who has been a law student and
graduate student, a law and psychology professor at four different universities,
and a law school associate dean and current senior university administrator. This
105, 107‒08 (2010). See also ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at 6‒16 (summarizing current
criticisms of legal education and noting that the faculty culture at law schools creates expectations
of job security and a focus on scholarship that may be adverse to the market interests of law
schools).
19. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 55‒61; Newton, supra note 18, at 140‒56.
20. See, e.g., Law Grads Give Schools High Marks, But Want Change, NAT’L JURIST (Sept.
17,
2013),
http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/law-grads-give-schools-high-marks-wantchange (reporting results of a survey of graduates of the class of 2013: eighty-seven percent thought
that legal education needed substantial reforms to better prepare students for practice, and sixtythree percent thought that law school could be shortened to two years).
21. See ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at 28‒32 (providing possible
recommendations for legal education reform).
22. See Gayatri Chakraorty Spivak, Preface to JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY xiv
(Gayatri Chakraorty Spivak trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1st Am. ed. 1976) (1974)
(explaining the deconstructive technique of placing a written term “under erasure”—crossing out a
word or phrase yet allowing it to remain in the text, denoting that the phrase does not adequately
signify the concept it represents).
23. See David Luban, Faculty Pro Bono and the Question of Identity, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 58,
67 (1999) (stating that “for more than a century law schools have battled to keep their distance from
vocational schools and maintain their rightful place in the university”).
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Article draws upon this experience to fashion a proposal for reforming legal
education, based on a comparative evaluation of the current model of legal
education with the models for medical and graduate education.
Part I of this Article addresses the contention that tenured law professors have
become too powerful in shaping legal education. Part II identifies a longstanding debate as to whether legal education should focus more on academic
work or on practical skills training. Part III argues that legal education must not
be reshaped into a less academic two-year program of vocational study. Instead,
the three-year program should be fashioned into a much more robust curriculum
that teaches applications of other disciplines (e.g., accounting, economics,
psychology) to law in addition to the traditional core subjects. Such an
integrated, interdisciplinary curriculum would expose law students to a
reasonable range of specialty areas and integrate practical skills training (e.g.,
client counseling, advocacy, legal drafting) throughout the curriculum. Part IV
considers adapting the medical school model to legal education in accomplishing
the goal of producing better-rounded and practice-ready lawyers. Such a
curriculum would provide a comprehensive foundation in basic legal subjects
interlaced with other legally relevant disciplines and would culminate in a series
of clinical rotations where basic doctrinal and interdisciplinary knowledge are
applied in practice. Part V argues against the claim that if law schools decreased
their support for faculty scholarship it would reduce costs and incentivize law
professors to be better teachers of practical skills. Contrary to popular claims,
engaged scholars are better teachers, and legal scholarship contributes
meaningfully and substantially (though often in ways not readily apparent) to
law practice and law reform efforts. Finally, Part VI addresses the employment
problem facing many law students upon graduation, suggesting that we need
fewer, but better law schools.
I. TENURED LAW PROFESSORS: THE PRIVILEGED CLASS ENJOYING ITS
PRIVILEGES
In The Philadelphia Story, the protagonist reflecting on high society during
the Great Depression proclaims, “the prettiest sight in this fine pretty world is
the privileged class enjoying its privileges.” 24 Are law professors the
“privileged class enjoying its privileges,” while students cover the cost of their
salaries by footing soaring tuition bills?25 Do law students view their professors
as “parasitic leeches who have amazingly cushy jobs, who hypocritically
pontificated about practicing law while having no real or current experience,
who cannot get the students jobs, and who do not work more than a couple hours
24. THE PHILADELPHIA STORY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1940).
25. See Barnhizer, supra note 7, at 676 (noting the incredible “degree of bitterness and
loathing held against [law professors] and [the] profession by this emerging culture of
disenfranchised law graduates and impoverished students”).
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a day”?26 The high price law school graduates pay for their legal education
coupled with poor job prospects, only exacerbate this vexed sentiment. High
faculty salaries, a major expenditure of law schools, are believed to be a key
cause of high tuition costs,27 as well as the desire for higher U.S. News rankings,
which produces an ever-increasing emphasis on legal scholarship to bolster the
school’s academic reputation among its peers.28 As a result, professors reduce
their teaching loads and devote more time to scholarly production, forcing law
schools to compensate by increasing the number of professors.29 Law schools
also compete for the “star” professors, who demand even higher compensation
and lighter teaching loads.30
Many reformers propose that law schools shrink the size of the full-time
faculty, increase teaching loads, and rely more on adjunct and part-time
faculty.31 But faulty assumptions underlie such proposals, which will harm the
overall quality of students’ legal education.32 It is not the case, for example, that
law professors devote less time to teaching than their university counterparts, as

26. Id. at 687. In addition:
[T]he matriculating law student [is portrayed as being] tricked into going to law school
by a coterie of greedy deans and financial-cocaine dealing lenders; preyed upon by an
uncaring, hypocritical, lazy, and disconnected faculty; and then when they have been bled
dry, they are thrown out into the world to face a lifetime of debt slavery, hopelessness,
and despair.
Id. at 667; see id. at 681 (describing posts to the various “law school scam” blog sites, including
one site that was visited over 400,000 times).
27. See In re Culver, slip op. at 11‒12 (Mont. filed Feb. 7, 2002) (Trieweiler, J., dissenting)
(noting that some non-ABA accredited law schools, such as the Massachusetts School of Law, are
able to offer lower tuition rates by having a small full-time faculty and many adjunct professors
teaching in their specialty area, and “by focusing on its faculties’ classroom ability rather than
providing extensive time off for research on which the ABA places extensive emphasis but which
most often contributes nothing to the improvement of society or our profession”); TAMANAHA,
supra note 1, at 52 (stating that lighter professor course loads requires schools to hire more
professors); see also Brent E. Newton, The Ninety-Five Theses: Systemic Reforms of American
Legal Education and Licensure, 64 S.C. L. REV. 55, 79‒80 (2012) (arguing that “[l]aw school
tuition is too high and is wrongly allocated primarily to benefit law professors at the expense of
law students. . . . [T]he typical tenured professor receives a handsome salary in return for
contributing relatively little to students’ legal educations”); Jennifer Smith, Law-School Professors
Face Less Job Security, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2013, 7:18 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10
001424127887323446404579006793207527958.html (quoting Kent Syverud, Dean of Washington
University School of Law, arguing that “[l]aw professors and law deans are paid too much. . . . The
whole problem of [tuition] costs probably would go away if our salaries were halved.”).
28. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 62.
29. Id. at 126.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 40‒45; Campos, supra note 1, at 216‒17; Mangan, supra note 1, at 3 (reporting
that some law schools have been reducing faculty size by offering early retirement packages and
not filling vacancies); Newton, supra note 27, at 125.
32. See infra Part V.A.
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some critics suggest.33 Unlike professors in graduate schools, law professors
generally do not have graduate teaching assistants who do much of the exam
grading, meeting with students, and class lecturing.34 As compared to professors
in other fields, students and administrators expect more from law professors visà-vis teaching because they teach in a professional school. 35 As Professor
Wallace Loh observed, “[m]ost social scientists, in contrast, view teaching as
ancillary to their research commitment. If they were as preoccupied about
teaching as their law school colleagues, their scholarly productivity would be
compromised.”36
Some critics also blame faculty governance, which vests the faculty with most
of the decision-making authority for faculty hiring and curricular decisions, for
the problems in legal education.37 Professor Tamanaha sees faculty governance
and the ABA (the law professors’ “trade union”) as vehicles the “privileged
class” use to protect its privileges: high salaries, low teaching loads, special
preferences for tenure-track faculty, and a focus on legal scholarship and pet
legal theories rather than teaching students practical skills.38 As the ABA’s Task
Force on the Future of Legal Education reports, “[f]aculty are blamed for

33. Cf. Newton, supra note 27, at 118‒19 (explaining that “a typical law professor teaches
only three or four courses per year”).
34. J.M. Balkin, Interdiscplinarity As Colonization, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 966
(1996); Richard S. Markovits, Taking Legal Argument Seriously: An Introduction, 74 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 317, 348 (1999); cf. Ted Becker & Rachel Croskery-Roberts, Avoiding Common Problems
in Using Teaching Assistants: Hard Lessons Learned from Peer Teaching Theory and Experience,
13 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 269, 274 (2007).
35. See Paula A. Monopoli, Teaching Lawyers to Be More Than Zealous Advocates, 2001
WIS. L. REV. 1159, 1170 (2001) (“Law schools are professional schools. . . . It is . . . essential that
they be given incentives to make their classroom presentations more effective.”).
36. WALLACE D. LOH, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: CASES, READINGS,
AND TEXT 737 (Russell Sage Foundation 1984). Having sat through many faculty and committee
meetings in law schools and psychology departments at five different universities, I can attest to
the amount of time devoted to discussing teaching and curricular concerns in law schools as
compared to psychology departments, where research and grant-getting are the most frequently
discussed topics. Indeed, law professors seem to be the only ones in the academy concerned with
the question of whether being a scholar improves one’s teaching effectiveness, since all but two of
the studies and articles on this issue were written by law professors. See Benjamin Barton, Is There
a Correlation Between Law Professor Publication Counts, Law Review Citation Counts, and
Teaching Evaluations? An Empirical Study, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 619, 619 (2008); James
Lindgren & Allison Nagelberg, Are Scholars Better Teachers?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 823, 823
(1998); Michael P. O’Connor, Perish the Thought of Publication?: Scholarship’s Critical Role in
Effective Teaching, 3 PHX. L. REV. 417, 418 (2010); Marin Roger Scordato, The Dualist Model of
Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 369 (1990); Fred R. Shapiro, They
Published, Not Perished, But Were They Good Teachers?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 835, 840 (1998).
37. See, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 8, 32; ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at
14 (discussing faculty culture and governance structures as potential obstacles to reforming legal
education).
38. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 16‒19.
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supposedly self-seeking behavior and the pursuit of questionable goals for the
law school,” 39 and “the prevailing structure for faculty role in a law school,
reflect[s] the model of a law school as primarily an academic enterprise . . . .
This entrenched culture and structure has led, inter alia, to declining classroom
teaching loads and a high level of focus on publishing and research.”40
To illustrate how faculty governance corrupts the ability of law schools to best
serve their students, Professor Tamanaha recounts in Failing Law Schools his
interim deanship at St. John’s University Law School.41 Remarkably, Professor
Tamanaha was appointed to the deanship as an untenured professor, after
brazenly complaining to the University’s president that the faculty voted for the
previous dean’s removal partly because he had pressured them to be good
teachers and scholars. He recalled that “[m]any faculty members were hardly
present in the building, coming in only to teach, leaving immediately thereafter
. . . . A number were in semiretirement, though not officially.” 42 Professor
Tamanaha uses his short-lived deanship to illustrate what he believes to be the
problem with law schools and why it is so difficult to reform them.43 He notes
that “[l]aw schools are run [by professors,] for law professors” who do not
devote the attention they should to teaching and serving the best interests of
students. 44 Standard 206 of the ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for
Approval of Law Schools require that law faculties have “substantial
involvement in the selection of a dean” and are to “advise, consult, and make
recommendations to the appointing authority in the selection of a dean.”45 Thus,
according to Professor Tamanaha, law schools are run to advance the privileges
of the tenured faculty, over whom deans have limited supervisory power:46
No one tells law professors what to do. Law professors are superior
to the students and served by the staff. . . . For a law school to function
at a high level requires that individual professors be self-motivated,
responsible, conscientious, and oriented to the common good even
39. ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at 7.
40. Id. at 26‒27.
41. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 1‒8.
42. Id. at 2. Professors who are effectively in semiretirement with respect to their scholarly
and service contributions, a relatively common phenomenon, are derided as “retired-in-place
(RIP).” Nancy B. Rapoport, Not Quite “Them,” Not Quite “Us”: Why It’s Difficult for Former
Deans to Go Home Again, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 581, 591 (2007). Some decide to take RIP status
soon after receiving tenure. Id.
43. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 8.
44. Id.
45. STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS § 206(d)
(2011) [hereinafter Interpretation 206-1] (emphasis added). Standard 206 states: “[e]xcept in
circumstances demonstrating good cause, a dean should not be appointed or reappointed to a new
term over the stated objection of a substantial majority of the faculty.” Id.
46. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 5‒6 (“Deans wield small sticks for prodding—twigs,
really—and consequently must resort to passing out goodies to get more out of people.”).
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when that requires a sacrifice of their own self-interest. . . . Alas, we
are fallible and self-oriented like everyone else.47
I value faculty governace more than Professor Tamanaha might, but it does
produce unintended consequences. Faculty incentives may not always align
with the interests of the institution or students, just as any employees not subject
to managerial oversight may come to regard their interests as not entirely
consistent with the interests of their employer or the customers. Curricular
decisions may be based on what and how particular faculty members want to
teach rather than the curricula and pedagogy students need, faculty hiring
decisions may be based on faculty turf battles rather than candidates’ teaching
and scholarly ability, and faculties may resist rigorous review processes that hold
them accountable for quality teaching and scholarship.
Since deans and law school administrators usually are not active teachers and
scholars,48 they usually have fewer conflicts of interest between what is best for
students and their own scholarly and teaching interests, and have incentives to
be more demanding of the faculty than the faculty is of itself. Faculty
governance diminishes the accountability of faculty members because when the
faculty corporately makes a decision that later turns out to be bad, no individual
is held accountable, and thus there is no way to effectively monitor and improve
faculty performance.49 By contrast, when deans are granted greater authority
they become the focus of accountability, both from the faculty—who can
effectively vote a dean out under ABA standards 50 —as well as from the
university administration. Importantly, deans should not be bureaucrats but
leaders, and part of leading is shaping the institution according to the dean’s
vision. A dean cannot do this when many key decisions rest largely with the
faculty, rather than also with the dean.
In addition, deans have a better sense of the relationship between the law
school’s mission and the larger university’s strategic goals and usually a more
objective, arms’ length perspective on faculty disputes given their outsider’s
perspective, since most deans were hired from other institutions.51 Moreover,
by virtue of their position as a university administrator, law school deans are
tuned into national norms and trends not only in the legal academy but also in

47. Id. at 8.
48. In 2008, the number of law professors increased to 17,080, with 1,059 being deans,
librarians, and other full-time administrators. Jack Crittenden, Why Is Tuition Up? Look At All the
Profs, NAT’L JURIST, Mar. 2010, at 40, available at http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/cypress/nat
ionaljurist0310/#/40.
49. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 36.
50. See Interpretation 206-1, supra note 45, at 14.
51. Colleen A. Khoury, Ruminations on A Deanship, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 105, 107 (2002).
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higher education generally, making them more broadly informed decisionmakers than are most faculty members about law school policies and priorities.52
To be sure, under no circumstances should the democratic process of faculty
governance be jettisoned in favor of autocratic or quasi-autocratic deans,53 but
law schools may want to reconsider the allocation of decision-making authority
between law school faculties and deans. If the faculty does not approve of how
the dean is steering the law school, then the faculty should not be reluctant to
vote for the dean’s removal.54
But critics like Professor Tamanaha go further and argue that the ABA should
loosen or eliminate its control over legal education, which would make law
professors and law schools more accountable to students and the
profession.55 According to Professor Tamanaha, the ABA “ha[s] been subverted
by legal educators to ratchet up their salaries and reduce their teaching loads,”
and above all, to define a good legal education as requiring a three-year program
of study in an academically-oriented institution (staffed mostly by full-time
faculty) that supports faculty scholarship, thus shutting out more affordable law
schools devoted to teaching rather than research. 56 To break the ABA’s
monopoly over an accreditation process that promotes the interests of professors,
these critics urge states to disregard ABA policies that allow “the ones being
regulated . . . [to] writ[e] the rules,”57 and admit graduates of non-ABA law
schools to practice.58
52. See id. at 107 (stating “a dean does see the institution from a unique perspective—a sort
of helicopter view from which one can see all the parts and how they work together and relate”).
53. Cf. Newton, supra note 27, at 73. Newton suggests:
[I]n order for systemic reform to occur, the model of governance will need to change to
one analogous to the “corporate” model—a powerful executive who, while not
omnipotent, does not require the consensus of . . . faculty members with respect to
significant administrative matters such as hiring decisions, curriculum reform, and the
like. Such corporate governance is the norm at American medical schools.
Id. (emphasis added).
54. See Interpretation 206-1, supra note 45.
55. See In re Culver, slip op. at 9 (Mont., filed Feb. 2, 2002) (Trieweiler, J., dissenting);
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 16‒17; Mathew D. Staver & Anita L. Staver, Lifting the Veil: An
Exposé on the American Bar Association’s Arbitrary and Capricious Accreditation Process, 49
WAYNE L. REV. 1, 74‒76 (2003).
56. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 18.
57. Id. at 36.
58. Id. Professor Tamanaha cites with approval a dissenting opinion from the Montana
Supreme Court in its denial of bar admission to a graduate of a school not accredited by the ABA,
but accredited by the Western Association of Schools and Colleges:
[T]he monopoly of this private trade association to set standards for law schools increases
the cost of legal education, burdens new members of the profession with debt that limits
their options for professional and public service, hampers innovations in the area of legal
education, discriminates against “working faculty” with practical professional
experiences to share with their students, and discriminates against non-conventional
students and minorities who do not meet the arbitrary admissions standards imposed.
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The accrediting authority of the ABA can be traced back to the turn of the
twentieth century,59 a time when lawyers were held in low esteem, the result of
too many low-quality law schools staffed mostly by non-academic practitioners
that were producing too many lawyers.60 In 1921, the ABA began to promulgate
standards required for law school accreditation, and graduation from an ABAaccredited institution was an eligibility condition most state bars adopted for
admission to the bar.61 Yet, in 2013, lawyers continue to be held in low esteem,
and there are still too many law schools and too many lawyers. What is the
proposed solution? Allowing law schools to once again offer two-year
vocational degree programs and graduates of non-ABA approved law schools to
practice law.
As discussed below, this Article vigorously disagrees with the notion that
legal education should be put under erasure by reshaping the three-year law
school curriculum into a two-year vocational program.
II. ACADEMY OR TRADE SCHOOL: EDUCATING OR JUST TRAINING LAWYERS?
[T]he critique of legal education has a long pedigree, traversing the
twentieth century and enduring through the present day. . . . [T]he
nature of the critique has been remarkably consistent, focusing on the
poor connection between traditional legal education and legal
practice.62
—Professor A. Benjamin Spencer
“The customer is always right” may have worked for Marshall Field,
but it is a prescription for disaster in legal education.63
—Professor Brian Leiter
A common complaint about legal education is that law schools have become
divorced from the practical needs of students and the profession. Such

Id. at 176 (quoting In re Culver, slip op. at 9 (Mont. Filed Feb. 2, 2002) (Trieweiler. J., dissenting)).
59. Staver & Staver, supra note 55, at 10‒11.
60. Id. at 21‒22.
61. Gerard J. Clark, Monopoly Power in Defense of the Status Quo: A Critique of the ABA’s
Role in the Regulation of the American Legal Profession, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1009, 1014
(2012); Staver & Staver, supra note 55, at 10‒11.
62. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1949, 2015 (2012).
63. Brian Leiter, A Different Take on the ABA Task Force Draft Report on the Future of Legal
Education, BRIAN LEITER’S L. SCH. REP. (Sept. 27, 2013), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leit
er/2013/09/a-different-take-on-the-aba-task-force-draft-report-on-the-future-of-legal-education.
html.
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arguments are not new.64 Almost twenty-five years ago, former ABA President
Talbot D’Alemberte observed that he “[could not] find many people who are
that happy with legal education. . . . The profession is not benefiting, the students
are not benefiting. In whose interest are we running legal education?”65 Indeed,
legal education has been debated almost since the founding of the Republic, and
the contours of that debate are not much different today. In the 1800s and early
1900s, people questioned whether formal legal training was necessary for bar
admission, and whether legal education should be practical or academic in
nature.66
This persistent criticism that legal education is insufficiently practical has
greater potency in the current economic environment, with critics arguing that
the current academic model of legal education cannot continue.67 The bar has
renewed the criticisms made by AALS President Thomas Morgan over two
decades ago, when there also was the concern “that young lawyers coming into
their firms require too much training” and that firms were unwilling “to
undertake the burden of sharing ‘nuts and bolts’ insights about law practice.”68
Once again, law firms are unwilling to train new attorneys,69 apparently feeling
little responsibility for doing so, either to the profession or young lawyers.70
This Article discusses proposals that would effectively put the legal academy
under erasure by making it vocationally, rather than academically, oriented, an
anti-intellectual approach condemned by the President of the AALS almost forty
years ago.71 There was a time when law schools thought it their mission to
provide a liberal arts education in the law to broaden students’ horizons,
cultivate critical thinking, and prepare lawyers to contribute to American

64. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S
1980S 119‒23, 162 (1983); John Nivala, From Bauhaus to Courthouse: An Essay on
Educating for Practice of the Craft, 19 N.M. L. REV. 237, 259 (1989); Sternlight, supra note 3, at
723-28 (discussing persistent criticisms that law schools fail to teach practical skills).
65. Talbot D’Alemberte, Talbot D’Alemberte on Legal Education, 76 A.B.A. J. 52, 52 (1990).
66. Thomas D. Morgan, A Defense of Legal Education in the 1990’s, 48 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1, 2‒4 (1991).
67. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 160, 181‒82; Henderson, supra note 1, at 462 (stating
that “[t]he demand for our core product—traditionally educated law school graduates—is
collapsing”).
68. Morgan, supra note 66, at 11.
69. See Henderson, supra note 1, at 462 (noting the unwillingness of clients to be billed for
the work of “lawyers in training”).
70. This trend is not limited to the legal job market. Employers in many fields are refusing
to provide the kind of on-the-job training and apprenticeships they once did, insisting that
universities now provide such vocational job-skills training. Employers are doing so to maximize
profits by shifting their training costs to universities. See PETER CAPPELLI, WHY GOOD PEOPLE
CAN’T GET JOBS 71‒75 (2014).
71. Francis A. Allen, The Prospects of University Law Training, 63 A.B.A. J. 346, 346 (1977).
TO THE
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democracy. 72 But today it is the market that rules, 73 and “nuts-and-bolts”
vocational training for law practice is what both students and employers appear
to want. 74 According to a recent Time/Carnegie Corporation survey, forty
percent of Americans think the goal of higher education should be to train
72. See Sternlight, supra note 3, at 720‒21 (discussing early legal education). Indeed, the
early law schools were established with the mission of educating future political leaders through a
liberal arts curriculum. Id. (citing treatises on history of legal education).
73. See SHEILA SLAUGHTER & GARY RHOADES, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND THE NEW
ECONOMY: MARKETS, STATE, AND HIGHER EDUCATION 181‒206 (2004) (discussing how
universities are under considerable pressure to generate revenue and respond to market forces, with
many configuring their programs and curricula in ways that will maximize their appeal to
prospective students, employers, and donors). Universities are adopting business models and
becoming entrepreneurial, even in non-professional disciplines. For example, classics departments
may offer trips to Greece or Rome for alumni or the general public. Id. at 27. Fine arts colleges
are shifting resources away from fields not having economic payoffs, like studio art, to those having
greater market demand, like graphic arts. Id.; see also Rebecca Flanagan, The Kids Aren’t Alright:
Rethinking the Law Student Skills Deficit, 2015 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 131, 150–51 (2015). Flanagan
notes that
[o]ne of the more troubling aspects of the customer orientation of students is an increased
focus on the extrinsic outcomes of a college degree . . . . The consumer orientation, and
corresponding extrinsic motivations, “radically alters” the fundamental nature of
education. Students no longer see themselves as partners in a relationship designed to
further growth; consumer orientation frames the relationship between student and teacher
as customer and service provider, with the customer expecting satisfaction. Students
who view education as an economic transaction become preoccupied with their GPA,
sacrificing “deeper, critical analytical learning” in pursuit of a credential they can
exchange on the market.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Although some argue that viewing education as a business model is
“entirely reasonable” to ensure that colleges “prove their worth” to their student-customers, this
proposition overlooks the risk that colleges acting solely as service providers “los[e] their value as
places where young people enter as adventurous adolescents and from which they emerge as
intellectually curious adults.” Andrew Delbanco, Illiberal Arts: What’s the Point of College? Two
Books Consider the Question from Different Perspective, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2013, at BR22
(reviewing JEFFREY J. SELINGO, COLLEGE (UN)BOUND: THE FUTURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND
WHAT IT MEANS FOR STUDENTS (2013)). For a discussion of the many negative effects on teaching
and higher education of the business and student-as-consumer models of higher education, see Joel
Thomas Tierno, How Many Ways Must We Say It?, ACADEME 11 (Nov.‒Dec. 2014) and MiguelMartinez-Saenz & Steven Schoonover, Jr., Resisting the “Student-As-Consumer” Metaphor,
ACADEME 15 (Nov.‒Dec. 2014).
74. See ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at 8 (discussing “the rise of consumer
outlook”). According to Jeffrey J. Selingo, education has turned into a business where students are
the customers purchasing a service, which creates “a major power shift in the classroom from
professors to the students.” SELINGO, supra note 73, at 20. As a result, students “regard their
professors as service providers, just like a cashier at the supermarket or a waiter in a restaurant.”
Id. Course evaluations, for example, “look eerily similar to customer satisfaction surveys from
department stores.” Id. This shift incentivizes professors to grade leniently so as to curry favor
with students in their course evaluations, and to entertain, rather than teach, students in order to
satisfy the student-customer. See id. at 21; see generally Richard E. Redding, Students’ Evaluations
of Teaching Fuel Grade Inflation, 53 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1227 (1988) (arguing, based on the
empirical evidence, that course evaluations cause professors to inflate grades).
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students in specific job skills and eighty three percent believe that curriculums
are too divorced from career training goals.75 Only twelve percent think the goal
should be to develop critical thinking skills, only eleven percent to help students
develop life values, and only six percent to become better-informed citizens.76
It is no wonder, then, that studies find today’s university students to be
“academically adrift,” 77 with dumbed-down curricula and limited student
engagement with learning. In a survey of students entering four-year colleges
in 2012, eighty-eight percent said that a chief reason they pursued higher
education was to get a better job, seventy-nine percent said it was to get training
for a particular career, and seventy-five percent said they wanted to make more
money.78 But seventy-three percent also said they wanted to get a good general
education, eighty-three percent wanted to learn more about what interested them,
and fifty-one percent strived to become more cultured. 79 Nonetheless,
policymakers and universities have responded to what they perceive as the
market demand for a laser-like focus on job skills, as seen in recent mandates
from the U.S. Department of Education that schools adopt “learning objectives
and assessment schemes that gauge whether students are learning the skills
required for particular jobs.”80 As a result, many law schools, including elite
schools, have been rethinking their curricula to focus more on practical
lawyering skills.81
Yet, as Professor Dan Solove of George Washington University Law School,
in defense of traditional, three-year law programs, explains:
[s]ome assume that the goal of a legal education should be to teach
people practical skills so that when they leave law school, they can
75. See Josh Sanburn, Higher-Education Poll, TIME (Oct. 18, 2012), http://nation.time.com/
2012/10/18/higher-education-poll/?pcd=teaser.
76. See id.
77. See RICHARD ARUM & JOSIPA ROSKA, ACADEMICALLY ADRIFT: LIMITED LEARNING ON
COLLEGE CAMPUSES 3‒5 (2011) (discussing the disconnect between today’s students and the
traditional model of education).
78. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Education Department Releases College Scorecard to
Help Students Choose Best College for Them (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/education-department-releases-college-scorecard-help-students-choose-best-colleg;
A
Profile of Freshmen at 4-Year Colleges, Fall 2012, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 19, 2013,
http://chronicle.com/article/A-Profile-of-Freshman-at/140387.
79. Id.
80. See Press Release, supra note 78. The College Scorecard, a website launched by the
United State Department of Education, provides statistics concerning a school’s “cost, graduation
rate, loan default rate, average amount borrowed, and employment.” Id. But see Ann Schoebelen,
The Jury Is Out on the New College Scorecard, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 25, 2013, available
at http://chronicle.com/article/The-Jury-Is-Out-on-the-New/137531/ (detailing experts’ criticisms
of the new scorecard).
81. See, e.g., Anne Cassidy, Strategic Planning: Rethinking the Future of Legal Education,
GEO. L. MAG., Spring‒Summer 2013, at 31‒32 (discussing Georgetown Law Center’s Strategic
planning council meeting to improve the school’s practicum experience).
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start practicing law like a pro. I don’t agree. [] We are training people
who will be in profound positions of power—future lawyers, judges,
politicians, policymakers and so on. It is important for all of society
that these individuals be given a legal education that consists of more
than just taking a few key classes and rushing off into the practice of
law. Law school is, for many, one of the few times that they reflect
more broadly on the law, on justice, on how the law ought to be, on
what works and doesn’t work well in the legal system. It is a chance
to learn about the history of law, the philosophy of law, law and
literature, law and sociology, law and economics, and more. I believe
that these things make students be better lawyers—wiser, more
creative, more well-rounded. When we train lawyers, we’re training
people who will be shaping our society, and I think it is imperative
that their legal education be a robust extension of a liberal arts
education, not simply a trade school education.82
A law school is not only responsible for teaching practical skills so that
employers do not have to bear the cost of training new associates. Law schools
share the collective responsibility to produce lawyers capable of contributing
meaningfully to public discourse, society’s civil institutions, policymaking, and
the democratic process. This is especially true given the influence lawyers have
in society today. 83 Professor Tamanaha quotes Professor Solove with
disapproval, however, emphasizing that lower-ranked law schools are not
training society’s leaders.84 Yet, since the founding of the Republic, lawyers
have dominated state legislatures (seventeen percent of legislators are lawyers)
and the U.S. Congress (fifty-four percent of Senators and thirty-six percent of
Representatives are lawyers, most of whom graduated from law schools not
ranked in the top fifty), and lawyers play significant policymaking roles in
government agencies and many private organizations.85 And, of course, judges
are lawyers, many whom did not graduate from top law schools.86

82. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 26‒27 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting
Prof. Dan Solove, George Washington University). Similarly, employers would probably prefer
their employees to have taken courses in technical writing or digital media rather than courses in
Shakespeare or nineteenth-century British poetry. Do we want our college graduates trained only
in the former and uneducated in the latter?
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. Catherine Rampell, First Thing We Do, Let’s Elect All the Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23,
2012, 1:37 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/first-thing-we-do-lets-elect-allthe-lawyers/.
86. See, e.g., Mission Statement, GOV’T & PUB. SECTOR LAWYERS DIV., AM. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/government_public/about_us.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2015)
(discussing the mission of public sector attorneys).
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One can imagine the critics’ response: a liberal arts education is inappropriate
in professional school,87 or a liberal arts education is fine for students at elite
schools, but everyone else only needs the most immediate, practical, and
efficient education possible. But, medicine, economics, psychology, and
education are also professions, yet these academic disciplines provide
substantial theoretical and interdisciplinary training to their students. 88 They
recognize that “there is nothing so practical than as a good theory,”89 since it
provides the descriptive and analytical framework for the deductive problem
solving, creative-thinking, and problem-solving flexibility necessary to confront
new problems across a range of practice contexts.90 A legal education centered
primarily on practical skills leaves students incapable of returning to the
foundational jurisprudential understandings needed when grappling with novel
legal problems and cases. Elitist and profoundly dismissive of students at nonelite schools, Professor Tamanaha’s approach implies that these students will
not achieve the sorts of careers requiring them to fashion novel and creative
approaches to legal problems. It also establishes a caste system among the bar,
with two types of lawyers having two different legal educations—one academic
and one vocational—an outcome not favorable for clients and the legal
profession. 91 Incorporating liberal arts education into legal education makes
students at any law school better lawyers—“wiser, more creative, more wellrounded”92 critical thinkers about the law best prepared to serve the clients and
causes they represent. Such an education incubates the development of critical
thinking, sound judgment, and an appreciation for intellectual and cultural

87. Dana M. Levitz, So, You Think You Want to Be a Judge, 38 U. BALT. L. REV. 57, 71‒72
(2008).
88. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 27.
89. See, e.g., KURT LEWIN, FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE: SELECTED THEORETICAL
PAPERS 168‒69 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1952); Jennifer S. Bard, Teaching Health Law, 36 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 841, 843 (2008) (comparing medical education to legal education).
90. For a discussion of the methodological value of teaching legal theory, see Jonathan
Crowe, Reasoning From the Ground Up: Some Strategies for Teaching Theory to Law Students,
21 LEGAL EDUC. R. 49, 55‒62 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2382356.
91. See, e.g., Bard, supra note 89, at 841, 843. Consider medical education. Although
medical schools vary in selectivity and the extent to which their faculties are research- versus
practice-oriented, all graduates of American medical schools receive essentially the same education
and mostly the same core courses and range of clinical experiences. See id. Narrowly and
technically trained physicians will suffice in instances where a patient presents routine problems.
However, a broadly trained physician, advanced in her specialty and capable of thinking critically
and creatively about medical problems, is required when a patient presents multifaceted or unusual
problems. Pity the client with a complex or unusual legal problem whose lawyer is trained only as
a legal technician in one or two discrete areas of the law.
92. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 26 (quoting Prof. Dan Solove).
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diversity.93 By grappling with foundational issues and theory in a variety of
relevant core disciplines, students develop the critical-thinking skills necessary
to apply insights from the humanities and social sciences to legal problems,
something clients very much need if they are to receive the most effective
representation.
Even if the overriding goal is to better train students for practice, it is
vocationally myopic to narrow the academic experience. I applaud teaching the
skills needed for law practice. Students need more of that, provided it is
appropriately integrated with relevant theoretical, doctrinal, and
interdisciplinary knowledge. In the long-run, lawyers who can think creatively
about the law will distinguish themselves as great lawyers, able to fashion
creative approaches to solving legal problems, novel legal arguments, and deal
structurings. Lawyers commit a disservice to their clients and the courts when
they are unable to draw upon relevant legal theory or insights from other
disciplines in providing policy rationales to support their proferred legal doctrine
or interpretation.94 As Professor Nancy L. Schultz observes, effective lawyers
not only know the skills of the trade, such as how to write a motion, draft
particular contract clauses, take a deposition, or avoid conflicts of interest, but
also must be able to “critically analyze the utility, effectiveness, and social
implications of legal doctrine and procedure; integrate nonlegal approaches
into the legal problem-solving process; and synthesize and build original legal
theories, frameworks, and systems.”95
Developing such a knowledge foundation and skill set requires not only
technical skills training, but also a liberal arts education in the law that “mak[es]
students work and think in ways and at levels of engagement and intensity that
are characteristic of graduate students elsewhere in the academy. . . [so] that
doctrine, theory, skills, and interdisciplinary perspectives on law all constituted
it in integral and equally-important ways.”96 Should we return to a time when
law school focused on “nuts-and-bolts” practice skills in a two-year curriculum,
or will legal education move forward to provide students with the robust
93. See James A. Arieti, Liberal Arts and the Human Soul, RECORD (Hampden-Sydney C.,
Hampden-Sydney, Va.), June 2011, available at http://www.hsc.edu/The-Record/2011-June/Liber
al-Arts-and-the-Human-Soul.html (arguing that a traditional liberal arts education in the
humanities, sciences, and social sciences uniquely develops the “psychic goods”—virtues such as
“courage, justice, moderation, wisdom . . . and a respect for the dignity of all one’s fellow human
beings and for the world of nature”).
94. See Arnold H. Loewy, Why I Authored a Criminal Law Casebook, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 661, 662 (2013) (providing an example where defense counsel, when asked by the court, was
unable to offer a policy rationale to support the legal standard for proximate cause that counsel had
argued for on behalf of his client).
95. Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers Really Think?, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 57, 60
(1992) (emphasis added).
96. Penelope Pether, Measured Judgments: Histories, Pedagogies, and the Possibility of
Equity, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 489, 537 (2002).
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academic experience needed to successfully navigate the complexities of law
practice in the twenty-first century?
III. NO PLACE FOR NOSTALGIA IN LEGAL EDUCATION
I believe that law schools would probably be wise to think about being
two years instead of three years.97
—President Barack Obama
[T]he law-school-in-two-years proposal rests on the premise that law
school is, or ought to be, a trade school. . . . It is not that. It is a
school preparing men and women not for a trade but for a
profession—the profession of law.98
—U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia
Ever since the ABA and AALS successfully established the three-year model
of legal education in the early 1900s,99 it has been argued that two years of law
school is sufficient, 100 an argument renewed by today’s reformers. 101 In
proposing a two-year law degree emphasizing practice skills,102 reformers are
nostalgic for American legal education circa one hundred years ago when law
schools were vocational schools. Some go even further,103 suggesting that legal

97. See Lattman, supra note 14, at B3 (quoting President Barack Obama’s statement at a
town-hall meeting at Binghamton University in New York).
98. See John Schwartz, Evaluating That Third—Boring—Year, N.Y. TIMES 25 (Education
Life, Aug. 3, 2014) (quoting Justice Antonin Scalia’s commencement address at William and Mary
Law School).
99. Campos, supra note 1, at 219‒20.
100. See, e.g., The Carrington Report, reprinted in HERBERT L. PACKER & THOMAS EHRLICH,
NEW DIRECTORS IN LEGAL EDUCATION app. A, at 138‒39 (1972) (noting that law professors have
questioned the efficacy of the third year).
101. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 20‒27 (including a discussion of the history of the third
year of law school); Campos, supra note 1, at 220 (stating that “[a]t a recent national conference
on legal reform, no one among a group of more than one hundred legal academics was willing to
defend the proposition that the third year of law school represented a justifiable investment”);
Samuel Estreicher, The Roosevelt-Cardozo Way: The Case for Bar Eligibility After Two Years of
Law School, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599‒600 (2012); Debra Cassens Weiss, TwoYear Law School Was a Good Idea In 1970, and It’s a Good Idea Now, Prof Tells ABA Task Force,
A.B.A. J. (Feb. 10, 2013, 1:36 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/two-year_law_schoo
l_was_a_good_idea_in_1970_and_its_a_good_idea_now/ (citing the testimony of law professors
before the ABA Task Force).
102. See ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at 31 (suggesting that the ABA consider
reducing the amount of instruction time required for a J.D. degree and “[s]eriously [c]onsider
[p]roposals to [r]educe the [a]mount of [l]aw [s]tudy [r]equired”).
103. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 23‒24.

378

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 64:359

training can be delivered entirely at the undergraduate level followed by a
professional apprenticeship, which was the predominant educational model in
the United States over a century ago.104 But this model was abandoned when it
became obvious that an apprenticeship alone provided insufficient training
because it did not teach the thinking and analytical skills necessary for solving
complex legal problems. 105 Even a recent Stanford Law School graduate
questioned the need for a legal education to practice law, and claims that three
years of law school churns out “over-educated” lawyers.106
There is clearly the sense among many, particularly law students,
practitioners, 107 and even some law professors, 108 that two years of legal
education is sufficient to prepare new generations of lawyers for the
complexities of law practice in the twenty-first century. Yet, as Professor
Thomas Morgan observes, even during three years of law school “there is not
nearly enough time in law school to prepare a new lawyer to meet all the
challenges that he or she will face in a practice.”109
Indeed, the current program of legal education produces under-trained, not
over-educated, lawyers. Doctrinal education alone need not be three years long,
but law schools should provide a more robust academic experience that teaches
the essential doctrine of first year courses, exposes students to a reasonable range
of specialty areas, and teaches the applications of other disciplines relevant to
law (e.g., accounting, economics, psychology, and quantitative methods, but
also some philosophy of law, comparative jurisprudence, and law and the
humanities). Further, schools should integrate skills training throughout the
curriculum. Achieving these pedagogical goals requires a minimum of three
years of law school. In all likelihood, it requires four years of study, as is the
case in medical education today.
To be sure, any proposal for a four-year J.D. curriculum is a non-starter in a
time when tuition costs are already exorbitant and reformists are pushing hard
in the direction of a two-year curriculum.110 Yet, confronting the ideal informs
our consideration of what should not be done. Law schools are currently failing

104. See Campos, supra note 1, at 220‒21.
105. See STEVENS, supra note 64, at 3.
106. Vijay Sekhon, The Over-Education of American Lawyers: An Economic and Ethical
Analysis of the Requirements for Practicing Law in the United States, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV.
769, 769‒70 (2007). Mr. Sekhon postulates that “[a]ttorneys probably do not need to know the
basic legal doctrines in all of the subjects taught in law school in order to be effective advocates. .
. . [I]t is difficult to argue that the benefits of three years of law school justify its significant
economic cost.” Id. at 780‒81 (internal citation omitted).
107. See Kaplan Bar Review Survey, supra note 9 (reporting that sixty-three percent of recent
graduates think that law school can be shortened to two years).
108. See Campos, supra note 1, 219‒20; Weiss, supra note 101.
109. Morgan, supra note 66, at 13.
110. See Weiss, supra note 101.
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to provide the theoretical and interdisciplinary training, integrated with the
necessary practice skills that students require to be competent attorneys in
today’s very complex practice environment. At a minimum, then, law schools
should not be entertaining the erasure of what little theoretical and
interdisciplinary training there is in legal education today by reducing law school
to just a two-year program of study, putting the J.D. degree on par with Master’s
degrees.
A. An (Un)Realistic Turn for Legal Education
The need for an understanding of other disciplines—history,
psychology, sociology, and economics—becomes plain after even the
most cursory examination of the range of problems lawyers and judges
face.111
—Professor Nancy L. Schultz
American legal education does not do enough to teach how law works
in the context of the social, political, and economic world that is
inhabited by lawyers’ clients. Teaching the law without its context . .
. is like teaching the Fourteenth Amendment without the Civil War.112
—Faculty Members of the Massachusetts School of Law
Arguing that law had become so “entangled” with political and social
questions, Judge Richard A. Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit described a system of law that was no longer an
“autonomous discipline,” but rather an interdisciplinary one, drawing on insights
from the sciences, social sciences, and humanities.113 Nearly thirty years later,

111. Schultz, supra note 95, at 65 (internal citation omitted). See also Brannon P. Denning,
The Yale Law School Divisional Studies Program, 1954‒1964: An Experiment in Legal Education,
52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365, 369 (2002) (quoting REPORT ON THE COMMITTEE ON CURRICULUM AND
PERSONNEL, YALE LAW SCHOOL (May 6, 1946) (concluding that it is “self-evident that law is one
of the social sciences, and that the law will be most fruitful and critical when skills and perspectives
of history, economics, statistics, psychology, political science, sociology, and psychiatry are fully
and effectively used”).
112. Andrej Thomas Starkis et al., Meeting the MacCrate Objectives (Affordably):
Massachusetts School of Law, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229, 240‒41 (1998) (discussing Massachusetts
School of Law’s development of a series of “law in context” courses).
113. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962‒1987, 100
HARV. L. REV. 761, 768‒73 (1987). Posner highlights the contributions of economics, philosophy,
and public choice theory to legal theory and policy, and states:
[the] confidence in the ability of lawyers on their own to put right the major problems of
the legal system has collapsed. . . . [D]ue partly to the rise of other disciplines to positions
where they can rival the law’s claim to privileged insight into its subject matter. . . . [such
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this same lack of autonomy is more apparent and more pronounced in everyday
law practice.114 Because the law includes concepts from other disciplines that
provide ways to critically analyze legal problems and policies in their social
context,115 lawyers ignore other disciplines at their peril. As was recognized by
the early twentieth-century legal realists,116 the law “is truly interdisciplinary in
the sense of being without discipline. . . . [T]he causes that come before the
lawyer, the pathology, madness, and injuries that get litigated can call upon any
number of skills of apprehension and determination.”117
When lawyers confront a legal question, they must investigate and develop
relevant facts. The social and business sciences often enlighten those facts and
their legally relevant social context. 118 Law itself is an empty vessel—“a
profession of process” 119 —a system for ordering, regulating, and mediating
human affairs that must rely on other disciplines for the knowledge upon which
legal doctrine and practices are shaped. 120 As Professor Peter H. Schuck
bemoans, the “single greatest failing” of legal education is that “we do not teach
our students how to handle facts—how to find, interpret, prove, and rebut
them.”121 Once law students master the basics of legal reasoning, which can be
as] the continuing rise in the prestige and authority of scientific and other exact modes
of inquiry.
Id.
114. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Ideal Law School for the 21st Century, 1, UC IRVINE L. REV. 1,
17‒18 (2011) (describing the UC Irvine Law School’s interdisciplinary first-year Legal Profession
course that teaches students about, inter alia, “the economics of the profession, the psychology of
being a lawyer, and the legal profession from a law and society perspective”).
115. See Denning, supra note 111, at 367, 369‒70.
116. Deborah M. Hussey Freeland, Speaking Science to Law, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
289, 317 (2013) (citing Oliver Wendell Homes, The Path of the Law, in AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM 15 (William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz, & Thomas Reed, eds.) (1993)).
117. See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986), in JOHN MONAHAN & LAUREN
WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASE AND MATERIALS 328 (8th ed. 2014) (discussing the early
legal realist movement); see also Peter Goodrich, Intellection and Indiscipline, 36 J.L. & SOC’Y
460, 468 (2009) (arguing that “courts should treat social science research relevant to creating a rule
of law as a source of authority rather than as a source of facts”).
118. Carl N. Edwards, In Search of Legal Scholarship: Strategies for the Integration of Science
into the Practice of Law, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 1, 2‒3 (1998).
119. See id. at 30.
120. See Richard E. Redding, Reconstructing Science Through Law, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 585, 585
(1999); see also John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Twenty-Five Years of Social Science in Law,
35 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 72, 74‒80 (2011) (noting that since the 1985 publication of the first edition
of their casebook, Social Science in Law, “American courts’ reliance on social science research was
often confused and always contested,” but “[i]n the past several years, it has become more difficult
to find a Supreme Court constitutional decision implicating an empirical question in which at least
one side did not cite to social science research”).
121. Peter H. Schuck, Why Don’t Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 323, 325 (1989).
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accomplished in the first half of law school, it becomes more important for
students to learn about the factual and policy context in which they will be
working than it is to learn more rules of process.122 Along with an insufficient
appreciation for the psychology and sociology of working with clients, the main
problem with legal education is a lack of attention to the substantive problems
the law seeks to resolve and regulate.
It may be argued that college, not law school, is the appropriate forum to
expose students to other disciplines. Unfortunately, few lawyers have an
undergraduate background in legally relevant disciplines, and few
undergraduate courses address the legal applications of those disciplines. 123
Even if legally relevant undergraduate courses were offered and taken, it is
unlikely that such courses would offer content at the level of sophistication
necessary for lawyer training. Moreover, undergraduate programs today leave
many graduates without a sufficiently well-rounded liberal arts education in the
essential and generalizable critical thinking, communication, and creative skills.
We should not further narrow and vocationalize their college education by
focusing it on legally-relevant courses and issues, rather than allowing pre-law
students to instead pursue a broad liberal arts education.124
Still, some feel that interdisciplinary education in law school is a luxury.125
Professor Anthony D’Amato insists that there is barely enough time in three
years of law school to teach what students must know about legal doctrine, and
that, because attorneys “can simply hire the appropriate [expert]” for any case,
“many advocates of interdisciplinary collaboration between a lawyer and a
social scientist do not seem to sufficiently appreciate the fact that the usefulness
of the social scientist begins after the lawyer has read, sorted, and categorized
122. See, e.g., CHAPMAN L. REV. SYMP., supra note 5, at 156‒57. Susan Meyers, Associate
General Counsel at Hyundai Capital American, said:
I thought I was very well prepared with my Harvard law degree to start practice. One of
my first assignments was to review a package of loan documents for a bank client . . . .
I started reading the document and realized that I didn’t know what the borrower’s
business was, I had no idea what the assets described involved, I didn’t know what a
financial condition was, or what EBITDA ratios were . . . . [I]t is important to learn and
be knowledgeable about your client’s business and the industry, almost more so than
knowing the law.
Id.
123. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE
LAW 53‒54 (1999); Richard E. Redding & Daniel C. Murrie, Judicial Decision Making About
Forensic Mental Health Evidence, in FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY: EMERGING TOPICS AND
EXPANDING ROLES 683, 685 (Alan M. Goldstein ed., 2007) (reviewing evidence that most lawyers
have little or no training in science and few understand basic statistical concepts).
124. For the same reasons, we should not shorten students’ college education by offering “3 +
3 programs” that allow students to complete college and law school in just six years by shaving off
one year of college, as some schools are now doing. See Mangan, supra note 1.
125. Anthony D’Amato, The Interdisciplinary Turn in Legal Education 4‒5 (Bepress Legal
Repository, Working Paper No. 1901, Dec. 2006), http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1901.
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the cases.”126 On the contrary, practicing lawyers regularly research the law in
an area in which they are unfamiliar. But without at least some knowledge of
other legally relevant disciplines, lawyers may fail to recognize when those
disciplines might be useful in resolving the client’s legal problem, and when
they ought to retain an expert. Ample social psychological research has shown
that people often fail to recognize their own incompetencies and knowledge
deficiencies. 127 Although interdisciplinary courses cannot survey every
potential circumstance under which another discipline might become useful in a
legal case, these courses can provide students with an introductory foundation
and representative sampling of practical applications to the law, raising students’
awareness of its legal applications.128
The usefulness to lawyers of psychological research on factors affecting the
accuracy of eyewitness testimony serves to illustrate the value of
interdisciplinary training.129 Especially in criminal cases, juries tend to give
eyewitness testimony great weight, which often can make or break the
case. 130 Yet, a compelling body of psychological research shows that
eyewitnesses frequently misperceive or misremember what they witnessed;
many jurors, and even judges, do not understand the potential variables that
affect the accuracy of eyewitnesses’ perceptions and memories.131 Accordingly,
uninformed jurors are not in a position to accurately assess the reliability of
eyewitness testimony.132 Unless exposed to the relevant research on eyewitness
reliability in a law school course or elsewhere, attorneys may fail to investigate
the particulars of their case for the presence or absence of these eyewitness
reliability factors, and may fail to consider that they should consult an expert on
eyewitness testimony and possibly call him or her as an expert witness at trial.
The social and business sciences, namely accounting, economics, quantitative
methods, and psychology, are useful to practicing attorneys for developing case
facts, understanding the extralegal context of cases, and counseling clients.
126. Id. at 12.
127. See generally David Dunning et al., Why People Fail to Recognize Their Own
Incompetence, 12 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 83, 83‒85 (2003), available at
http://jstor.org/stable/20182845 (discussing their findings); Ethan Zell & Zlatan Krizan, Do People
Have Insight into Their Abilites? A Metasynthesis, 9 PSYCHOL. SCI. 111, 111‒13 (2014), available
at http://pps.sagepub.com/content/9/2/111.
128. See JOHN MONAHAN & LAUREN WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASE AND
MATERIALS 328 (8th ed. 2014) (entitled “Social Science Used to Make Law”) (describing the
applications of social science to determine case facts, make new law, provide relevant context for
juries and legal decision-makers, and to plan the litigation of a case).
129. See Kate A. Houston et al., Expert Testimony on Eye Witness Evidence: In Search of
Common Sense, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 637, 638, 649‒50 (2013).
130. See Neil Brewer & Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification, 20 CURRENT DIRECTONS
PSYCHOL. SCI. 24, 24‒25 (2011), available at http://cdp.sagepub.com/content/20/1/24.
131. See Houston et al., supra note 129, at 637‒39, 648.
132. See supra notes 127‒31 and accompanying text.
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Accounting is the language of business. 133 Without a proper foundation in
accounting, an attorney practicing in any business field may be excluded from
many meaningful conversations, limited in his or her understanding of relevant
financial documents, and branded as hopelessly unsophisticated. Additionally,
accounting teaches fundamental ethical principles about when safeguards are
required. Many ethical issues are solved “on the natural” if the attorney
understands basic accounting rules.134 Economics is the study of efficiencies,
trade-offs, moral hazards, and incentives, which is what much of the law
concerns itself with—selecting those legal policies and doctrines that best
achieve market efficiencies and incentivize desired behavior.135 Consequently,
“economic thinking dominates contract, commercial, bankruptcy, antitrust,
corporate, and securities law and related fields . . . [and] is also influential . . . in
tort, criminal, and property law and civil procedure.”136 Economics is at the
heart of cost-benefit analysis, which is essential to the administration of
environmental law, for example.
Psychology, the study of human behavior, has many insights to offer law and
legal practitioners: guidance in litigating a cases, such as jury selection, crafting
jury instructions, and jury persuasion; counseling clients, such as therapeutic
jurisprudence; determining case facts, such as consumer surveys of trademark
confusion or risk assessments of defendants’ future dangerousness; or providing
relevant context to assist the finders of fact, such as research on the reliability of
eyewitness testimony or the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis.137 For example,
basic principles of forensic psychology may guide a criminal defense attorney
or prosecutor in dealing with mentally-ill defendants, competency concerns, and
133. Mae Kuykendall, No Imagination: The Marginal Role of Narrative in Corporate Law, 55
BUFF. L. REV. 537, 569 (2007).
134. Joan T.A. Gabel et al., Evolving Regulation of Corporate Governance and the
Implications for D&O Liability: The United States and Australia, 11 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 365,
388‒89 (2010) (noting the rise in governmental supervision and regulation of the auditing
profession).
135. See HENRY N. BUTLER & CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR
LAWYERS 4‒5 (2d ed. 2006) (noting that “individuals, businesses, and other economic actors . . .
[generally] seek to maximize their ‘self-interest.’ . . . The rational maximizer responds to changes
in incentives in a predictable manner.”); see, e.g., David A. Weisbach, in The Future of Law and
Economics: Essays by Ten Law School Scholars, REC. ONLINE (U. Chi., Chi., Ill.), Fall 2011,
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/fall11/lawandecon-future (discussing the use of
economics in the resolution of climate change-related issues).
136. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, in The Future of Law and Economics: Essays by Ten Law School
Scholars, REC. ONLINE (U. Chi., Chi., Ill.), Fall 2011, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/maga
zine/fall11/lawandecon-future.
137. For a thorough discussion of the role the social sciences play in the legal process, see
MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 128, at v‒vi. See generally Richard E. Redding, How CommonSense Psychology Can Inform Law and Psycholegal Research, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
107 (1998) (outlining “a ‘common sense psychology’ approach to psycholegal research and
advocacy”).
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mental health evidence at sentencing hearings; these issues will arise more
frequently in practice than many of the doctrines taught in criminal law courses,
such as necessity, duress, and impossibility. 138 Furthermore, psychological
research has a long history of use in legal reform, including the school
desegregation cases, death penalty jurisprudence, and affirmative action law.139
Legal practitioners must also be conversant in the quantitative and scientific
methods of the business and social sciences, whether as litigators understanding
scientific evidence140 or as business attorneys understanding basic accounting
principles. 141 Accordingly, law students should be required to take one
quantitatively-oriented course, such as accounting, law and economics, or
statistics for lawyers.142 George Mason University School of Law, for example,
offered a required course in “analytical methods for law” that surveyed the
legally relevant basics of decision analysis, theory, statistics, accounting,
finance, microeconomics, law and economics, and economic and financial issues
relating to contracts.143
The humanities may also contribute to legal education. The Carnegie
Foundation Report on Legal Education emphasized the need for law students to
understand their professional identity and purpose as lawyers:
(1) what are the core values of the legal profession?; (2) what does it
mean, morally and ethically, to be a lawyer?; (3) how should lawyers
shoulder the mantles of power and authority in their professional

138. See Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal
Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 52‒53 (2006) [hereinafter Redding,
The Brain-Disordered Defendant]; Richard E. Redding, Why It Is Essential to Teach About Mental
Health Issues in Criminal Law (And a Primer on How to Do It), 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 407,
407‒08 [hereinafter Redding, Mental Health Issues in Criminal Law] (2004).
139. See Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
567, 603 (2003) (citing Cass R. Sunstein et al., Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide (2002);
William Meadow & Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51 DUKE L.J. 629 (2001));
MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 128, at ch. 4 (entitled “Social Science Used to Make Law”).
140. Federal trial judges must assess the reliability of proffered scientific evidence. See
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993); see also Margaret A. Berger, The
Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 12‒13 (3d
ed. 2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sciman3DOI.pdf/$file/sciman3D
OI.pdf (discussing the implications of Daubert). Lawyers must be prepared to litigate these issues,
which requires that they have a basic understanding of scientific methods and statistics. Thus, the
second chapter of Monahan and Walker’s casebook, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 128, at
33, is a social science methodology “primer” for law students.
141. See Newton, supra note 27, at 94‒95 (emphasizing that corporate lawyers “must speak
‘the language of business’ in order to provide their clients effective assistance”).
142. See id.
143. Francesco Parisi, Multidisciplinary Perspectives in Legal Education, 6 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 347, 350‒51 (2009). See also Howell E. Jackson, Analytical Methods for Lawyers, 53 J. LEG.
EDUC. 321, 322‒24 (2003) (describing the “Analytical Methods for Lawyers” course and casebook
offered at Harvard Law School).
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lives?; and (4) what does it mean to “flourish” as a lawyer and how, if
at all, is that different than flourishing as a person?144
Enlightenment on these matters will not be found in either the Model Rules
of Professional Responsibility or in legal ethics opinions. The humanities,
including law and literature, provide an ideal vehicle for students to engage such
questions, as does law and religion, particularly in religiously-affiliated law
schools.145 Courses based in the humanities equip students to confront the value
choices and ethical dilemmas they will face in practice, because “[l]iterary
accounts of lawyers’ work—and more general literature that deals with themes
such as truth, virtue, and justice—helps readers to understand not only the
responsibilities of lawyers but also the social exigencies to which lawyers must
respond.”146
A recent study published in Science found that reading fiction improves a
person’s ability to understand the perspectives, emotions, and needs of others.147
For example, the lessons of Dickens’ Bleak House,148 Dostoevsky’s Crime and
Punishment,149 Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird,150 Kafka’s The Trial,151 Grisham’s
A Time to Kill, 152 and Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter, 153 provide valuable
extralegal perspectives on the power of legal norms and the legal system (and
the souls caught up in it), often conveying deeper truths about the legal system
than the law does itself, thereby “offer[ing] a very direct preparation for the
challenges of [practicing law].”154 Literature can also be used as a pedagogical
device. For example, Professor Martin H. Pritkin uses Arthur Miller’s play, The

144. R. Michael Cassidy, Beyond Practical Skills: Nine Steps for Improving Legal Education
Now, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1515, 1525 (2012); see also Jacob Soll, The Economic Logic of the
Humanities, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 24, 2014), http://search.proquest.com/docview/1501850
218?accountid=9940 (describing how the great economists and political philosophers “placed the
liberal arts at the center of economic thought” because policy issues must “be analyzed through the
lens of philosophy, psychology, and history”).
145. Cassidy, supra note 144, at 1525 n.59 (stating that the professionalism retreat offered to
students at Boston College Law School “is loosely based on St. Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises”).
146. Mark Sanders, Law and Literature: Resources for Illinois Attorneys and Law Students,
87 ILL. B.J. 109, 109 (1999).
147. See David Comer Kidd & Emanuele Castano, Reading Literary Fiction Improves Theory
of Mind, 342 SCIENCE 377, 377‒79 (2013).
148. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1985) (1853).
149. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Constance Garnett trans., Random
House 1956) (1866).
150. HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Grand Cent. Publ’g 1960).
151. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Tribeca Books 2011) (1925).
152. JOHN GRISHAM, A TIME TO KILL (Doubleday 1989).
153. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Dover Publ’n 1994) (1850).
154. Arieti, supra note 93; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 21‒22, 389
(3d ed. 2009) (arguing literature can provide lawyers with unique insights on jurisprudential
questions).
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Crucible, to teach students how to think strategically about evidentiary issues at
trial.155
[I]t is crucial that we not abandon the humanistic foundations of
education in favor of narrow, technical forms of teaching intended to
give quick, utilitarian results. Those results are no substitute for the
practices, sometimes painstaking, of inquiry and critique that enhance
students’ ability to appreciate and understand the world around
them—and to respond innovatively to it. A reflexive, pragmatic
liberal education is our best hope of preparing students to shape
change and not just be victims of it.156
By studying how other disciplines approach sociological problems, lawyers
are better prepared to question whether the best solution is a legal one, 157
whether the best alternative is the legal doctrine or remedy presently on the
books, and whether the social and behavioral assumptions underlying legal
doctrines and procedures comport with empirical reality or merely reflect
untested common-sense assumptions. Jurisprudence, critical theory, and the
social sciences provide insights into how the law functions, how the law is
perceived to function, how the law is failing to function, or how the law ought
to function in society. As Professor Pierre Schlag cautions, such “disruptive
questions” are harder to come by when legal education is confined to the
“internal perspective” of the law.158
Since the days of legal realism, it has been recognized that empirical questions
are at the heart of law, which is replete with doctrines and practices that fail to
reflect social reality.159 A narrow focus upon understanding established doctrine
from the insider perspective of the legal system itself reifies lawyers as “appliers
of law rather than as creators of law” who are little more than “apologist[s] and
technician[s] for established institutions and things as they are,” and “confines
legal education to the ‘what is’ and neglects the promise of ‘what might be.’”160
Instead, law schools should equip lawyers to “relentlessly question the validity
of what they think they know, accept received truths with skepticism, and

155. Martin H. Pritikin, Can Law and Literature Be Practical? The Crucible and the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 687, 703 (2012) (discussing the evidentiary lessons that the
interrogation scenes in The Crucible can provide to law students).
156. Michael S. Roth, The False Promise of “Practical” Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
May 19, 2014.
157. See generally PAUL F. CAMPOS, JURISMANIA: THE MADNESS OF AMERICAN LAW 5‒6
(1998) (arguing that we tend to cast all social problems in legal terms requiring a legal solution).
158. See Pierre Schlag, Anti-Intellectualism, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1111, 1112 (1995).
159. See Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant, supra note 138, at 108‒10 (discussing
how the behavioral assumptions underlying much of law are inconsistent with social science
research findings).
160. Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 247, 254‒55, 262 (1978).
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wonder with every [legal problem] what improved understanding or novel
[solution] is just around the corner.”161
Thus, “course[s] in legal history, sociology, institutions, hermeneutics, theory
and sociology . . . give[] . . . students places to stand outside the habituation of
and by doctrine or law.”162 Only then may students “gain the purchase necessary
to fashion it, from the beginning, in other images”163 to advance the interests of
their clients and to act as legal policymakers or reform advocates. Courses in
jurisprudence and comparative law provide students with useful alternative
approaches to various legal doctrines and procedures and instill a critical
mindset whereby students question law’s foundational assumptions and
practices, the necessary starting point for change. 164 Unlike law students,
students in other disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, film studies,
history, and English, graduate with a grounding in the competing foundational
schools of thought associated with their discipline. These disciplines find such
a grounding fundamental, a prerequisite for creative problem solving, yet few
law students receive such an education. How many lawyers can talk
meaningfully about competing schools of jurisprudence, different approaches to
providing procedural justice, or about the meaning of “justice” itself?165
A word of caution is required, however. If interdisciplinary courses are to be
successful as a requirement for law school graduation, professors teaching such
courses must be mindful that students will be asking the “so what” question.
Students will wonder what this has to do with law practice, or even more
pragmatically, with passing the bar. Thus, professors should teach these courses
in an applied context, clearly illustrating how the other disciplines are useful in
solving legal problems. Even then, some students will feel that learning more
legal doctrine, in lieu of the interdisciplinary exposure, is of greater value and
interest to them,166 particularly because many law students are somewhat phobic
of quantitative disciplines such as accounting, statistics, or economics. 167
161. MOLLY COOKE, DAVID M. IRBY & BRIDGET C. O’BRIEN, EDUCATING PHYSICIANS: A
CALL FOR REFORM OF MEDICAL SCHOOL AND RESIDENCY 30 (2010) (applying this approach to
medical students).
162. Pether, supra note 96, at 538.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 513; see also Cramton, supra note 160, at 249 (recognizing a need for attorneys to
distinguish between desired results and reality).
165. See, e.g., Goodrich, supra note 117, at 468.
166. See Redding, Mental Health Issues in Criminal Law, supra note 138, at 421, 425
(reporting results of a survey of students in a first-year criminal law course). The survey found that
while many students reacted positively to practice-relevant insights from the social sciences, a
substantial minority of students reacted negatively because they felt such issues were irrelevant as
these topics are not tested on the bar examination, and they found legal doctrine to be more
important. Id. at 422‒26.
167. See Leonard J. Long, Basic Economics for Aspiring Lawyers: A Review of Richard A.
Ippolito, Economics for Lawyers, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 219, 219 (2009) (noting that prospective
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Nonetheless, if taught properly, most students will react positively to the
interdisciplinary insights bearing on legal problems and everyday lawyering.168
B. Teaching Knowledge and Skills Together
Lighthouse, him no good for fog. Lighthouse, him whistle, him blow,
him ring bell, him flash light, him raise hell; but fog come in just the
same.169
—Dean William L. Prosser
[We should] offer[] in legal education a complexity that matches the
complexity of the legal world in which our students will function after
they graduate. . . . [The notion of] “skills” versus “substance”—ought
to be banished from our thinking.170
—Professor Nancy L. Schultz
The 2007 Carnegie Foundation Report, 171 the 1992 ABA Report on Legal
Education (MacCrate Report),172 and even the early 1914 and 1921 Carnegie

law students can meet the criteria for admission “having no aptitude for science or mathematics,
and having had no exposure to accounting, psychology, political science, statistics, literature,
philosophy, or other useful subjects including economics”); Robert J. Rhee, Specialization in Law
and Business: A Proposal for A JD/“MBL” Curriculum, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 37, 45‒46 (2013)
(stating that most incoming law students “do not come to law school with a basic knowledge of
business”).
168. In teaching my first-year criminal law course, I frequently discussed psychological
concepts relevant to understanding criminal behavior, defenses to crimes, and the effective
representation of criminal defendants. Comments from students illustrated that they understand the
benefit:
[Psychology] is such an important issue in terms of defenses, witnesses, and determining
what punishment will or will not be effective. I think it is crucial to proper representation.
. . . The study of law should not be limited to learning the trade of lawyering [as] the
ability to understand and apply the social policies behind the law aid in serving our
clients. I will work in the U.S. Attorney’s Office this summer and the materials regarding
mental disorder and mental illness will be food for thought.
Redding, Mental Health Issues in Criminal Law, supra note 138, at 424‒25. A student also
commented that “[i]t gave [her] a much broader perspective on our criminal justice system, and
what is wrong with it.” Id.
169. William L. Prosser, Lighthouse No Good, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 257, 257 (1948‒49) (quoting
a Native American saying as a metaphor for American legal pedagogy in 1948).
170. Schultz, supra note 95, at 57.
171. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 22 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT].
172. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, TASK FORCE
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Foundation studies173 all lambasted law schools for failing to teach legal practice
skills. The MacCrate Report identified ten skills 174 and four professional
values175 that every law graduate should have.176 Still, law schools generally do
a poor job of teaching these skills and professional values. Responding to the
renewed call for such training, many schools now require students to take an
upper-level transactional or litigation skills course, applied capstone course, or
a clinic or externship.177 State bars are also mandating skills training in law
school. For example, the California State Bar, attempting “to foster the
development of professional competency skills,” now proposes that candidates
for bar admission complete at least fifteen units of upper-level coursework or
“participat[e] in Bar-approved externships, clerkships or apprenticeships for
courts, governmental agencies, law firms or legal service providers.”178
But requiring students to take only a few skills or clinical courses is
insufficient, and only emphasizes the false dichotomy between doctrine and
practical skills. Rather, skills must be integrated throughout the curriculum,
along with theory and doctrine, as each is necessary to the other. Nothing is
more useful than a good theory, which provides the conceptual framework for
deductive and inductive problem-solving when deploying one’s skills. Most
errors in problem-solving occur because the person’s underlying theory or
“mental model” is faulty or incomplete.
Moreover, the key feature
differentiating the expert from the novice is that “[t]he expert’s knowledge is
less context-specific or situation-specific in that he/she can generalize abstract
principles in order to solve problems across a range of situations.”179
ON SCH.:

NARROWING THE GAP 5, 266 (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT] (demonstrating
the failure of law schools to recognize the importance of teaching professional skills).
173. JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
LAW SCHOOLS: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
TEACHING 68‒69 (1914); ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW:
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPAL CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF LEGAL EDUCATION
IN THE UNITED STATES WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS IN ENGLAND AND CANADA 48‒49
(1921).
174. Problem solving; legal analysis and reasoning; legal research; fact investigation;
communication; counseling; negotiation; litigation and alternative dispute resolution; organization
and management of legal work; and recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas.
175. Provision of competent representation; striving to promote justice, fairness, and morality;
striving to improve the profession; and professional development.
176. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 172, at 138‒41.
177. See Chart of Legal Education Reform (2011) (on file with the Catholic University Law
Review).
178. STATE BAR OF CAL., TASK FORCE ON ADMISSIONS REGULATION REFORM: PHASE I
FINAL REPORT 24 (2013), available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/bog/bot_Ex
ecDir/ADA%20Version_STATE_BAR_TASK_FORCE_REPORT_(FINAL_AS_APPROVED_
6_11_13)_062413.pdf.
179. Richard E. Redding, Metacognitive Instruction: Trainers Teaching Thinking Skills, 3
PERF. IMPROV. Q. 27, 30 (1990).
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Skills are the mechanism by which legal knowledge is applied and understood
in context, and skills practice provides students with feedback on how their
knowledge should be interrogated, synthesized, and refined.180 Active learning
best motivates and engages students, since they can see how the theory is useful,
and skills application is the ultimate form of “learning by doing.”181 However,
research in cognitive psychology indicates that skill development requires
continual practice across a range of legal contexts and problems, particularly if
the skills are to transfer to the complex cases students will handle in practice.182
Accordingly, to be effective, skills training must be neither too little, too early
(e.g., a few add-on skills components in first-year courses), nor too little, too late
(e.g., a few skills courses or clinics in the last year of law school), but must be
integrated into all three years of law school.
Consider legal writing skills, as taught through first-year legal writing courses
and the several seminar or drafting courses law schools now require. 183 In
comparing students’ writing during the first year of law school with their writing
at graduation, it is often the case that though they have mastered the nuts-andbolts of legal writing, there has been little improvement in their writing style,
which is something that requires continued practice and refinement.184 To truly
develop students’ writing skills, law schools must incorporate writing exercises
into courses throughout the curriculum,185 and these writing exercises should
180. Id. at 27‒28.
181. Id. at 31‒33.
182. Don Peters, Mapping, Modeling, and Critiquing: Facilitating Learning Negotiation,
Mediation, Interviewing, and Counseling, 48 FLA. L. REV. 875, 885–86 & n.20 (1996) (citing
GORDON H. BOWER & ERNEST R. HILGARD, THEORIES OF LEARNING 77‒78 (5th ed. 1981)); Don
Peters & Martha M. Peters, Maybe That’s Why I Do That: Psychological Type Theory, the MyersBriggs Type Indicator, and Learning Legal Interviewing, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 169, 173 n.15
(1990) (stating that “sufficient repetitive practice opportunities is critically important to skill
development”); see Stefan H. Krieger, Domain Knowledge and the Teaching of Creative Legal
Problem Solving, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 149, 149 (2004) (concluding that “basic knowledge of
substantive legal doctrine is a necessary prerequisite to learning effective legal practice”); Redding,
supra note 179, at 30‒32 (1990) (reviewing research on the transferability of skills problem); see
also Yasmin Sokkar Harker, “Information Is Cheap, but Meaning Is Expensive”: Building
Analytical Skill into Legal Research Instruction, 105 LAW LIBR. J. 79, 95 (2013) (noting that
“literature from cognitive and educational psychology offers an enormous amount of information
instructors can use and apply, especially in the area of analytical skill development and learning”);
see generally ROBERT E. HASKELL, TRANSFER OF LEARNING (2001).
183. See, e.g., Legal Writing at Duke Law, DUKE L. SCH., https://law.duke.edu/curriculum/leg
alwrit (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (providing an overview of the different types of legal writing
courses).
184. Susan Hanley Kosse & David T. Butleritchie, How Judges, Practitioners, and Legal
Writing Teachers Assess the Writing Skills of New Law Graduates: A Comparative Study, 53 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 80, 87 (2003).
185. A word of caution about teaching skills: often when professors attempt to incorporate
skills training into their courses, the pedagogical focus becomes the nuts-and-bolts mechanics
(glorified paralegal training or “soft skills” only) rather than deeper problem-solving skills.
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also serve to develop other practice skills. For example, a course in business
associations might require students to draft corporate bylaws or a shareholder
agreement based on a mock term sheet, with the students representing the parties
and negotiating the terms with one another.
To teach knowledge and skills in an integrated fashion, law schools must
develop a competency-based curriculum, whereby we teach the knowledge and
skills required of attorneys and test for these expert-typical competencies in
applied contexts. Legal doctrine and skills, when taught in a manner divorced
from the larger social and factual context and case history, is not an effective
pedagogy. 186 Reflecting on her time teaching at an Australian law school,
Professor Penelope Pether observed that educators “actually tested what it was
[they] wanted students to learn, skills and content both, and as a result courses
were generally continually assessed using a range of assessment models. . . .
[S]tudents wrote and otherwise applied what they were learning a lot, in many
genres, everywhere in the curriculum . . . .”187 Similarly, the California Bar
proposes restructuring the bar examination to test practical competencies “that
are found among the best and most successful lawyers” rather than “standardized
test-taking skills and knowledge of legal doctrine.”188 We should adopt the same
approach throughout legal education.
To do so effectively, we must first “identify the knowledge, skills, behaviors,
and attributes of highly successful [attorneys] . . . and then work backwards,”
using the identified knowledge and skills as course learning objectives.189 Two
recent studies identifying the generic skills, such as listening skills, creative
problem solving, and emotional intelligence, that are characteristic of successful
attorneys are helpful, but only a rudimentary beginning. 190 Educational and

Students may “become adept at workplace procedures without developing deeper conceptual
understanding of the rationale for the practices they are learning.” See COOKE, IRBY & O’BRIEN,
supra note 161, at 223 (discussing a similar problem in medical schools).
186. See Spencer, supra note 62, at 2036‒38. Professor A. Benjamin Spencer observes:
[T]he case-dialogue method often strips disputes from their context and emphasizes
formal and procedural issues over other moral or personal factors that might bear on
reaching a more complete appraisal of the justice of an outcome . . . . Omitted is any
consideration of the underlying record, including documents, evidence, pleadings, trial
transcripts, trial court rulings, and the like, or the raw client narratives and other facts
that faced the practitioner at the pre-litigation, problem-solving phase of the
representation, in favor of a retrospective view that stymies the development of the “legal
imagination” . . . .
Id. (citations omitted)
187. Pether, supra note 96, at 507.
188. STATE BAR CAL., supra note 178, at 13.
189. Henderson, supra note 1, at 496.
190. See Neil W. Hamilton & Verna E. Monson, Ethical Professional (Trans)Formation:
Themes From Interviews About Professionalism with Exemplary Lawyers, 52 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 921, 946‒51 (2012); Marjorie M. Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness:
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cognitive psychologists should be recruited to conduct sophisticated and
comprehensive studies of lawyering skills to identify the knowledge, mental
models, and skills of expert attorneys in various practice areas.191
Such studies, which have been conducted in other fields, examine how experts
do their work, using a technique known as “cognitive task analysis.”192 This
technique employs experimental techniques, such as cognitive interviewing,
psychological scaling, performance modeling, and error analysis, to identify the
underlying knowledge base, mental models (high-level conceptualizations of
problems and tasks providing the framework for solving problems), planning
and attention allocation skills, and decision-making and problem-solving
strategies differentiating between those more skilled versus less skilled at
various tasks.193 The goal is to determine how expertise develops over time,
how to expedite learning, and how to identify the developmental antecedents to
such expertise, including the beginning and intermediate knowledge and skill
sets prerequisite to moving to higher expertise levels. In sum,
a cognitive task analysis [of lawyering] should include: (a) the
development of measurement instruments for assessing individual
abilities as well as changes in the knowledge base; (b) the
identification of task components; (c) the identification of the
conceptual and procedural knowledge required for similar
components; (d) the identification of differences between novices and
experts, as well as intermediate states of knowledge; and (e) the
specification of the learning conditions which best facilitate progress
from one knowledge state to the next.194
Curriculum designers can use the findings from a cognitive task analysis to
optimally structure and sequence instruction in a way that will promote students’
development of the expert-typical cognitive structures and skills; and, to provide
individualized instructional feedback about discrepancies between the experttypical knowledge structures, mental models, and problem-solving strategies
and the students’ own.

Broadening the Basis for Law School Admissions Decisions, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 620, 629,
630 tbl.1 (2011).
191. Joan M. Ryder & Richard E. Redding, Integrating Cognitive Task Analysis into
Instructional Systems Development, 41 EDUC. TECH. RES. & DEV. 75, 75‒76 (1993). See, e.g.,
Seamster et al., Cognitive Task Analysis of Expertise in Air Traffic Control, 3 INT’L J. AVIATION
PSYCHOL. 257, 257‒58 (1993).
192. See COGNITIVE TASK ANALYSIS 3‒4 (Jan Marten Schraagen, Susan F. Chipman &
Valerie L. Shalin eds. 2000).
193. See, e.g., Seamster et al., supra note 191, at 257‒58; see generally COGNITIVE TASK
ANALYSIS, supra note 192, at 3‒6 (providing an introduction to cognitive task analysis); Redding,
supra note 179, at 27 (discussing metacognition); Ryder & Redding, supra note 191, at 75 (noting
a shift in job demands from requiring behavioral responses to sophisticated cognitive skills).
194. Redding, supra note 179, at 36‒38.
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IV. THE MEDICAL SCHOOL MODEL: THE RIGHT PRESCRIPTION FOR LEGAL
EDUCATION?
One limitation is the casual attention that most law schools give to
teaching students how to use legal thinking in the complexity of actual
law practice. Unlike other professional education, most notably
medical school, legal education typically pays relatively little
attention to direct training in professional practice. The result is to
prolong and reinforce the habits of thinking like a student rather than
an apprentice practitioner . . . .195
—Authors of the Carnegie Report
The arguments against changes in law school curriculum are
remarkably similar to those raised against changing the medical
school curriculum.196
—Professor Jennifer S. Bard
It is instructive to compare law schools to medical schools, because both are
professional schools preparing students for practice that have been criticized for
failing to do so. In the early twentieth century, “medical education in the United
States was faced with many of the problems that critics feel are confronting legal
education today: an over-production of practitioners . . . proliferation of
professional schools, insufficient financing, and inadequately trained graduates
entering the profession.” 197 The 1910 Carnegie Foundation’s evaluation 198
hugely impacted medical education, with medical schools adopting its
recommendation that medical education be more clinically oriented.199
Early American legal education similarly was clinically oriented, a structure
borrowed from the British apprenticeship model, with many states requiring
lengthy apprenticeships for admission to the bar.200 Eventually legal education
turned away from this approach, prompted by Harvard Law Professor
Christopher Langdell’s introduction of the notion that law was a “science,” best

195. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 171, at 188.
196. Jennifer S. Bard, Teaching Health Law: What We in Law Can Learn from Our Colleagues
in Medicine about Teaching Students How to Practice Their Chosen Profession, 36 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 841, 847‒48 (2008).
197. Robert M. Hardaway, Legal and Medical Education Compared: Is It Time for a Flexner
Report on Legal Education?, 59 WASH. U.L. REV. 687, 687‒88 (1981).
198. A. Flexner, Medical Education in the United States and Canada, BULL. 4 (THE CARNEGIE
FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING 1910).
199. Hardaway, supra note 197, at 697‒99.
200. Id. at 699‒700.
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mastered by classroom case study,201 and today law is about the only profession
that does not require some form of apprenticeship experience before becoming
licensed to practice. 202 An early twentieth-century critic of American legal
education observed that while medical schools trained their students by having
expert physicians model medical decision-making across hundreds of patients,
law schools exposed students only to particular kinds of cases—those resulting
in appellate litigation—found in casebooks.203 The critic explained:
The medical student is taught how to do it right in the first place. He
watches the operations of eminent surgeons. He sees top-ranking
physicians examine living patients. . . . [H]e does things not merely
once, as a law class visits a courthouse, but literally hundreds and
hundreds of times . . . . And at the same time he is being taught the
theory of medicine. He learns to read x-rays, not by reading in a book
about a patient dying because someone did not read an x-ray correctly,
but by reading hundreds of x-rays under expert supervision.”204
Until recently, the first year of medical school taught students 205 the basic
medical sciences, such as anatomy, microbiology, and biochemistry, in large
lecture classes. 206 In 1998, the American Association of Medical Colleges
(AAMC) reformed medical school curricula to better link theory to practice and
facilitate “discovery learning.” Medical schools shifted to problem and casebased pedagogies whereby basic sciences are taught in the context of their
clinical relevance (e.g., cancer cell biology and treatment rather than basic cell
biology), with clinical experiences and competency-based assessments
incorporated throughout the four years of medical school.207 Today, medical
students are taught the basic sciences as they inform the medical applications,
and students receive considerable practice exposure via clinical rotations where
the applications of basic sciences to medical practice are stressed.208 Such an
integrative pedagogical model is rare in legal education, which still focuses on
doctrine at the expense of jurisprudential theory and legally-relevant insights
201. The 1912 ABA Committee on Legal Education noted that a significant advance had been
“[t]he recognition of the superiority of the law school over the office preparation or the Bar.” Henry
A. Rogers et al., Report of the Committee on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, in REPORT
OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 595, 602‒04
(1912).
202. CHAPMAN L. REV. SYMP., supra note 5, at 155.
203. Hardaway, supra note 197, at 706.
204. Id. at 706‒07 n.115.
205. See Bard, supra note 89, at 844 (stating that the first two years of medical school looked
like the current law school model).
206. See id.
207. See id. at 844‒46 (stating that “almost all medical schools . . . now incorporate some
version of problem-based learning (PBL)”); see also COOKE, IRBY & O’BRIEN, supra note 161, at
80‒81 (stating that “PBL is the essence of ‘discovery learning’”).
208. See Bard, supra note 89, at 845‒46.
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from other disciplines, and which often teaches clinical skills divorced from the
practical applications of theory.209
The alarms raised by the 2010 Carnegie Foundation Report on medical
education should resonate with legal education reformers, who call for similar
reforms.210 The report lambasted medical schools for failing to teach students
how to think creatively about medical problems, for over-emphasizing factual
knowledge, and for failing to prepare them adequately for practice.211 The report
urged schools to do a better job of linking foundational scientific knowledge to
practice.212 Similarly, the 2007 Carnegie Report on legal education urged law
schools to “mediate between the claims for legal theory and the needs of
practice, in order to do justice to the importance of both while responding to the
demands of professional responsibility.” 213 To accomplish these goals, law
schools should consider adapting the medical school model to legal education,
crafting a curriculum that: (1) teaches foundational doctrine in the core subjects
during the first year and a half of law school, but in an applied context whereby
students practice skills through case simulations and problem-solving exercises;
(2) exposes students to a reasonable range of specialty areas via elective courses
during the second and third years, in a fashion that integrates doctrine with skills;
(3) requires students to take a certain number of courses from a menu of
interdisciplinary courses focusing on practical applications to law practice, such
as jurisprudence or critical theory, accounting, economics in law, psychology or
criminology in law, quantitative methods for lawyers, and courses in law and the
humanities; and (4) provides students with clinical experiences early in law
school, while devoting much of the final year of law school to a series of clinical
rotations that exposes them to different practice areas.

209. Marin Roger Scordato, Reflections on the Nature of Legal Scholarship in the Post-Realist
Era, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 353, 357‒59 (2008). See also CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 171,
at 10 (finding that “careful analysis of intelligent practice reveals a more intricate relationship
between theory and practice . . . an understanding that is still poorly appreciated in the academy as
a whole”).
210. Compare COOKE, IRBY & O’BRIEN, supra note 161, at 23 (finding “instances of
foundational knowledge poorly linked to experience”), and Richard B. Gunderman, A Prescription
for What Ails Medical Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 20, 2013, at A60 (lamenting that
“[m]any medical students gain remarkably little practical, hands-on experience”), with Jean R.
Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating A Common Sense
Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707, 727‒28 (1996) (noting
the overwhelming criticism “on law schools’ alleged failure to convey a variety of practical skills”).
211. COOKE, IRBY & O’BRIEN, supra note 161, at 23.
212. Id. at 23‒30; see also Richard B. Gunderman, A Prescription for What Ails Medical
Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 16, 2013), http://search.proquest.com/docview/14738617
08/1A851A99E5E843AFPQ/1?accountid=147762 (citing surveys of physicians, many of whom
complained that medical residents lack basic practice skills).
213. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 171, at 12.
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The structure of legal education in the twentieth century essentially rendered
the first year of law practice, the fourth year of law school. Today, however,
law firms resist the cost of training first-year associates in basic practice skills,
and demand that law schools assume much of that responsibility.214 But most
law schools do not require students to complete any clinical experience for
graduation, 215 most law students do not enroll in clinics, 216 and externships,
where students often receive little meaningful supervision and frequently
perform largely clerical and low-level tasks, may be of questionable value.217
By contrast, clinical rotations give students the opportunity to meaningfully
experience different practice areas. These hands-on training experiences also
equip students to make more informed career decisions about which practice
specialties to pursue. Just as medical schools offer clinics in each of the major
specialties, law schools could offer community clinics in a range of practice
areas, such as the clinic courses offered at New York Law School.218
Yet, as Professor Jennifer S. Bard explained, “it is difficult to teach someone
how to do something that you yourself do not know.” 219 Professor Brent E.
Newton asks us to “[i]magine a medical school faculty dominated by professors
with minimal experience in treating real patients. . . . [H]ow [then] can we allow
the equivalent to occur in the context of legal education?”220 A cadre of adjunct
faculty, who bring other benefits to a law school, can assist full-time faculty in
managing and supervising the clinics. 221 Adjunct professors bring valuable
practice expertise that many full-time faculty members, who only practiced
briefly with a large firm or government agency, lack in comparison.222 Adjunct

214. Robert J. Condlin, “Practice Ready Graduates”: A Millennialist Fantasy, 31 TOURO L.
REV. 75, 95 (2014).
215. Spencer, supra note 62, at 1949.
216. Id. at 2018 (citing data from the National Association for Law Placement). However, the
ABA is considering a proposal requiring law school students to complete at least six credit hours
of clinical, externship, or simulation-based courses. See Karen Sloan, Panel Near Decision on Law
Students’ Bar Exam Passage Rates, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/
id=1202641943246/Panel-Near-Decision-on-Law-Schools-Bar-Exam-Passage-Rates.
217. See ROSS PERLIN, INTERN NATION: HOW TO EARN NOTHING AND LEARN LITTLE IN THE
BRAVE NEW ECONOMY xiv‒xv (2012).
218. See Clinics, N.Y. L. SCH., http://www.nyls.edu/academics/office_of_clinical_and_experi
ential_learning/clinics/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2014).
219. Bard, supra note 89, at 844.
220. Newton, supra note 27, at 113.
221. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, STANDARDS
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2013‒2014, Interpretation 304-3(e),
24‒25 (2013) [hereinafter Interpretation 304-3(e)], http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abal
publications/misc/legal_education/standards/2013_2014_final_aba_standards_and_rules_of_proc
edure_for_approval_of_law_schools_body.authcheckdam.pdf.
222. See Walter Bumphus, Partner with the Private Sector, TIME (Oct. 17, 2012),
http://ideas.time.com/2012/10/18/8-ideas-to-improve-higher-education/slide/partner-with-the-priv
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professors can also share their practitioner’s real-world insights on curricular
matters and faculty scholarship.223
Insofar as clinical education is concerned, Arizona State University Law
School, New York Law School, and Washington and Lee University School of
Law perhaps come the closest to adopting something akin to the medical school
model.224 Arizona State University Law School created its own law firm staffed
by clinical and adjunct faculty, law students, and newly minted graduates,225 just
as medical schools do with associated university teaching hospitals.226 At New
York Law School, students are required to complete a two-semester course,
working with “trained actors with whom students practice their interviewing,
fact-gathering, and counseling skills.” 227 In addition, the third year of law
school is entirely devoted to “three nine-week full-time clinical rotations”
available through their twenty-six clinics.228 Washington and Lee University
School of Law has transformed the third year of law school into a series of skills
emersion, experiential, and clinical courses.229
However ideal the medical education model may appear for teaching
knowledge and skills together, there are significant limitations to the value of
ate-sector/; see also ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at 25 (stating that law schools alone
cannot equip students with all the practice competencies and that law firms and other legal
organizations must help train new lawyers).
223. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, BEST
PRACTICES REPORT ON THE USE OF ADJUNCT FACULTY 10, 35 (2011) [hereinafter BEST
PRACTICES REPORT ON THE USE OF ADJUNCT FACULTY]. See also CHAPMAN L. REV. SYMP.,
supra note 5, at 167 (setting forth Professor Cassidy’s comment that “[w]e need to have really
experienced lawyers and judges, who are senior in their career, join faculty on a short-term basis,
for example, a ‘distinguished visitor from practice,’ we’ll call it”).
224. See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, To Place Graduates, Law Schools Are Opening Firms, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2013, at A14 (discussing Arizona State University Law School); The Third Year in
Detail, WASH. & LEE. U. SCH. L., http://law.wlu.edu/thirdyear (last visited May 1, 2013).
225. See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, supra note 224 (discussing Arizona State University Law
School).
226. See, e.g., Steven Dowshen, What’s a Teaching Hospital?, KIDSHEALTH.ORG (Apr. 2013),
http://kidshealth.org/PageManager.jsp?dn=KidsHealth&lic=1&ps=107&cat_id=20253&article_se
t=60611; What is a Teaching Hospital?, BARNABAS HEALTH (last visited Nov. 3, 2014),
http://www.barnabashealth.org/Medical-Education/What-is-a-Teaching-Hospital-.aspx.
227. New York Law School Named One of 20 Most Innovative Law Schools, N.Y. LAW SCH.
(Aug 8, 2012), http://www.nyls.edu/news-and-events/new-york-law-school-named-one-of-20most-innovative-law-schools/.
228. Why NYLS? The City is Our Classroom, N.Y. L. SCH. 6‒8, http://www.nyls.edu/admissio
ns/wp-content/uploads/sites/144/2014/09/ADMS-Viewbook-2015-16-F-City-Classroom.pdf (last
visited Nov. 3, 2014) [hereinafter NYLS BROCHURE].
229. CHAPMAN L. REV. SYMP., supra note 5, at 159‒62 (setting forth Washington and Lee
University School of Law Professor James Moliterno’s description of the school’s innovative thirdyear education program, a series of twelve experiential courses that “put the students in the role of
lawyer”). See Washington and Lee’s New Third Year Reform Leading the Way in Legal Education
Reform, WASH. & LEE U. SCH. L., http://law.wlu.edu/thirdyear (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
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clinical rotations in legal education. Medical training programs are designed
with the following considerations in mind: “What are the clinical experiences
that a newly minted physician in this specialty should have encountered under
supervision? How many instances should she have seen? What level of
proficiency or sophistication should she have attained?” 230 During clinical
rotations in the last two years of medical school, students are exposed to
thousands of cases ranging in complexity and patient populations, often assisting
the supervising physicians with a dozen or more patients daily. 231 Further,
medical students rounding at teaching hospitals will be exposed to patients
presenting complex and challenging medical problems because these patients
are often referred to the teaching hospitals of medical schools.232
In contrast, law school clinics provide students with only a handful of cases,
due to the time commitment required to handle most legal matters. 233 Law
clinics also usually handle relatively simple cases (e.g., drafting a simple will,
filing a no-fault divorce, mediating a small claims dispute, trying misdemeanor
cases) involving particular kinds of legal issues (most clinics do not, for
example, handle international business transactions, corporate law, real estate
transactions, or felony criminal cases). 234 Although clinics will introduce
students to real cases, law students are exposed to a very limited range of client
populations and case types that are not representative of the diverse populations
and complex cases they will encounter in practice. In terms of the number and
range of clients and cases and the complexity level of these cases, the clinical
training law schools are able to provide pales in comparison to the clinical
training provided by medical schools. For these reasons, the kind of work
students do in existing law school clinics may have little transferability to their
later law practice.
Consider also the opportunity cost involved in the time taken away from
teaching theory, doctrine, and interdisciplinary perspectives on the law. This is
a huge cost; young lawyers will acquire lawyering skills in practice but are not
likely in practice to study legal theory or critical perspectives on law and the
230. See COOKE, IRBY & O’BRIEN, note 161, at 237.
231. See id. at 239 (discussing the heavy workload of medical school students during their
internship rotations).
232. FLEXNER: 75 YEARS LATER, A CURRENT COMMENTARY ON MEDICAL EDUCATION 27
(Charles Vevier ed. 1987) (“[T]eaching hospitals tend to attract the most complex cases; the
patients are sicker and have a higher rate of complications.”); see also COOKE, IRBY & O’BRIEN,
supra note 161, at 164 (discussing how university teaching hospitals “provide general and
specialized clinical care to some of the most severely ill and injured”).
233. See Bard, supra note 89, at 846; R. Sam Hoover, A Physician Becomes An Attorney With
Little Advice: A Case Study, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 43, 44 (2010) (stating law school clinical
programs do not compare, experience wise, to medical school programs).
234. See, e.g., NYLS BROCHURE, supra note 228, at 6; Fact Sheets, ARIZ. STATE UNIV. LAW
SCH., https://www.law.asu.edu/clinics/TheClinicalProgram/ClinicFactSheets.aspx (last visited
Mar. 9, 2015).
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legal system, making law school the only time for such an education. How many
legal skills do students actually acquire, retain, and generalize after working on
a few relatively simple cases in just one or two semester-long clinics? To be
sure, there is a pressing need for graduates to be “practice ready.”235 But we
must consider whether this is a realistic goal given the limited number and range
of skills we are likely to impart to students in a few clinical or skills-based
courses and via the few, usually time-consuming, skills exercises we can
feasibly incorporate into traditional courses.
It may appear that the solution to these intrinsic problems in clinical legal
education is to adopt the model of medical schools, which have fee-charging
teaching hospitals and outpatient clinics staffed by a cadre of full-time clinical
faculty.236 Perhaps in collaboration with the private sector, law schools might
operate like law firms, offering reduced-fee legal services staffed by tenure-track
supervising faculty who are valued as highly as their non-clinical
counterparts.237 But this would only partially solve the range and complexity of
cases problem, since full-paying clients having more complex cases or business
law cases are not likely to retain the services of the school’s firm unless the
school can staff it with distinguished supervising practitioners, as medical
schools do in their teaching hospitals (with patient insurance covering much of
the cost). The problem of exposure to only a small number of cases would
remain, though not if new graduates obtain their first year of practice experience
in the law school firm, as a kind of legal internship similar to a medical
internship. Unfortunately, given the structure of legal education and the legal
services market, the viability of law-school affiliated firms is questionable; most
previous attempts to establish such firms have failed.238
V. MARGINALIZING SCHOLARSHIP
The high quality and distinctiveness of American legal education are
based largely on the work of career, full-time faculty who engage fully
in the law school’s teaching, scholarship, and service missions. Fulltime faculty should be experts in their fields and continue to engage in
scholarship that makes them even more accomplished. . . . The
scholarship and public service of career, full-time faculty do not
merely supplement their teaching role. Both scholarship and public
235. But see Robert Condlin, “Practice Ready Graduates”: A Millennialist Fantasy, U. of
Maryland Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2013-48 (Nov. 18, 2014) (challenging the notion that
law schools can produce “practice-ready” graduates).
236. See, e.g., John Z. Ayanian & Joel S. Weissman, Teaching Hospitals and Quality of Care:
A Review of the Literature, 80 MILBANK Q. 569, 569‒70 (2002).
237. See Chemerinsky, supra note 114, at 16 (noting that at most law schools “clinical faculty
are essentially second-class citizens—or worse” and are non-tenure-track faculty).
238. See id. at 18 n.16, 19.
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service underlie teaching and give it an authority that teachers who
merely pass on received understanding or transmit skills cannot
match.239
—Professor Michael A. Olivas
One of the most potent criticisms of legal education today is that law
professors are preoccupied with their scholarship at the expense of teaching.240
It has become fashionable for critics, particularly non-academics and those law
professors who have not been successful scholars, to assert that “many law
professors are so absorbed in their scholarly pursuits that they are largely
unconcerned with students’ needs,” 241 and “that there is no significant
correlation between professors’ records of publishing and their teaching
effectiveness.”242 Implicit in such arguments is the notion that the legal scholar
can separate his or her academic expertise from teaching and deliver legal
education in instrumentalist, reductive ways. Sure, legal scholars can put the
intellectual side “under erasure,” as Derrida would say,243 but this does not mean
that scholarly inquiry fails to inform what they do as teachers and practitioners.
It is wrong to suggest that law professors are scholars above all else, with law
schools “set up like research universities” where scholarship is “the coin of the
realm.”244 Critics often complain that professors run law schools to promote
their scholarship, but this is far less true for law schools than graduate schools,
where virtually everything is geared toward promoting the professors’
research.245 To be sure, scholarship has grown in importance in determining a
law professor’s salary and standing among his or her colleagues, but it is far

239. Letter from Michael A. Olivas, Former President of Ass’n of Am. Law Sch., to Hulett H.
Askew, Consultant on Legal Educ. Section of Legal Educ. of Admission to the Bar, Am. Bar Assoc.
3 (March 28, 2011), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20110409195546/http://www.aals.
org/advocacy/Olivas.pdf.
240. Newton, supra note 18, at 132.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 107‒08.
243. Spivak, supra note 22, at xiv.
244. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 43, 45.
245. See, e.g., Graduate Assitantships, WORCESTER ST. UNIV., http://www.worcester.edu/Gra
duate-Assistantships (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). For example, graduate school admissions
decisions are driven by whether applicants can assist professors with their research; many
professors are interested in teaching and mentoring graduate students only insofar as doing so
facilitates the faculty member’s research; and, some professors will try to stretch out students’ time
in graduate school so they have the benefit of their cheap labor and developing expertise. Michael
W. Kraus, Is Graduate School a Ponzi Scheme?, PSYCH. TODAY (Jan. 19, 2012),
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/under-the-influence/201201/is-graduate-school-ponzi-sch
eme; see, e.g., Graduate Assistantship Responsibilities, WORCESTER ST. UNIV., http://www.worces
ter.edu/Graduate-Assistantships (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
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from being the only determinative factor. 246 Other currency, such as elite
credentials or holding professional leadership positions, still carries considerable
cachet.247 For example, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan, prior to being
appointed a justice, was a law professor at the University of Chicago and then
Harvard Law School, where she later served as dean. Yet, in Justice Kagan’s
approximately fifteen-year long academic career, she published just six articles
and one book chapter, 248 a publication record likely not even warranting
tenureand certainly not the rank of full professorin most other colleges at
those very same universities.249 The fact that professors like Justice Kagan can
achieve the pinnacle of success belies the notion that scholarship is the coin of
the realm in the legal academy.
A. Engaged Scholars Are Better Teachers
It is a red herring to argue that scholarship is unrelated to teaching. To be
maximally effective teachers, professors must also be engaged with their
discipline as scholars. Non-scholar professors may have a wonderful classroom
presence, great rapport with their students, and employ very effective and even
cutting-edge pedagogical techniques.250 But professors should question whether
these effective pedagogical skills are wasted on teaching stale content that they
themselves mastered only by reading the casebook and through their own
usually limited, years-old practice experience.
Grappling with the sorts of questions one encounters when undertaking
scholarly work is the best way to stay current in a field, while continually
engaging the mind in a much more active way than simply staying atop the cases
and legal literature. Non-scholar professors are unlikely to remain on the cutting
246. Matthew T. Bodie, Funding Legal Scholarship, 4 J.L.: PERIODICAL LABORATORY OF
LEG. SCHOLARSHIP 107, 108‒09 (2014). See O’Connor, supra note 36, at 422‒23 (2010) (finding
that “the studies comparing student evaluation scores with the number of publications or citations
may be looking at one measure rather than engaging in a comparative analysis”).
247. See Bruce D. Fisher & Paul Bowen, The Law School Compensation System at Three Top
Quartile State Law Schools: Factors Correlating with Law Professors’ Salaries and Suggestions,
19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 671, 687‒90 (1999).
248. Thomas Goldstein, 9750 Words on Elena Kagan, SCOTUSBLOG (May 8, 2010, 1:00
A.M.), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/05/9750-words-on-elena-kagan/.
249. See Christi Parsons, U. of C. Law Faculty Didn’t Back Kagan, CHI. TRIBUNE (May 30,
2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-05-30/news/ct-met-kagan-chicago-20100530_1_ha
rvard-law-school-elena-kagan-faculty. In addition, casebook and treatise authoring also has cachet
in law schools. But it is eschewed elsewhere in the academy as being non-scholarly (counting for
little in promotion, tenure, or merit pay decisions) because these are teaching and reference
materials that do not generate new knowledge, the defining characteristic of “scholarship.”
250. See O’Connor, supra note 36, at 422‒23 (surveying the empirical literature on the
relationship between scholarship and teaching effectiveness). The few studies of the relationship
between professors’ scholarly productivity and teaching effectiveness have been conflicting or
inconclusive, measuring teaching effectiveness through student course evaluations, which tend to
focus on instructional style rather than content and rigor. Id.
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edge of the current scholarship in their field, and will likely teach current modal
practices but not necessarily the best practices. Practitioners, serving as adjunct
or part-time professors, usually have neither the time nor the inclination to track
and contribute to legal scholarship and innovation.251 As a consequence, they
are poorly positioned to mentor students in cutting-edge developments and in
thinking about legal problems in new and innovative ways. By contrast, an
engaged scholar keeps abreast of cutting-edge thought in her specialty and
contributes innovative perspectives and solutions through her scholarship.
When surveyed, law students say that the most effective teachers are those who
are the acknowledged scholarly experts in their field. 252 Indeed, the elite
universities are thought to provide a superior education largely because the top
scholars in their fields serve on their faculties.
The quintessential expert is one who drives her field by creating new
knowledge, not one who merely acquires expertise secondhand—by reading
casebooks and treatises. We should want those teaching our students to possess
the highest level of expertise possible. The ability to develop innovative ideas
(“inventing”) requires a higher order of insight about one’s field than does
understanding and applying pre-existing knowledge (“practicing”).253 The ABA
accreditation standards, recognizing the correlation between scholarship and
best-practices instruction, require that law school faculties engage in
scholarship. 254 But Professor Tamanaha proposes the elimination of that
standard, 255 while Professor Newton asserts that because law schools are
professional schools, “[l]aw review articles published by law professors amount
to an improper cross-subsidy from students to professors.”256 To be sure, law
schools are professional schools training students for practice. But they are also
academic institutions, and if law professors do not generate legal scholarship,
who will?

251. Dean Erwin Chemerinsky argues that the teaching quality of adjunct professors is
generally inferior to that of full-time faculty because they are less experienced teachers and have
less time to prepare for class. Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, You Get What You Pay For in Legal
Education, NAT’L. L.J. (July 23, 2012), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202564055135?sl
return=20150210223643. ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at 29 (suggesting that the ABA
consider permitting a greater percentage of courses to be taught by adjunct and part-time faculty).
252. See James B. Levy, As Last Resort, Ask the Students: What They Say Makes Someone an
Effective Law Teacher, 58 ME. L. REV. 49, 76‒77 (2006) (“The results . . . make good common
sense because it stands to reason that students are much more likely to pay attention in class when
they have faith in their teacher’s knowledge and expertise.”)
253. See COMM. OF COLL. & UNIV. EXAM’RS, TAXONOMY OF EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES:
THE CLASSIFICATION OF EDUCATIONAL GOALS 41 (Benjamin S. Bloom ed., 1956).
254. Interpretation 304-3(e), supra note 221, at 29.
255. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 173.
256. Newton, supra note 27, at 128‒29.
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B. Legal Scholarship Contributes to the Public Good
As Judge Posner observed, “[t]he academy does not generate the knowledge
that judges, lawyers, and legislators need in order to operate a modern legal
system, yet there is no other institution capable of generating it.”257 The mission
of universities is, and has been, the advancement of knowledge. 258
Unfortunately, in recent years universities have begun to shift from a public good
regime, valuing knowledge production for its own sake, to a capitalist regime,
valuing knowledge production only if economically useful to the university or
its graduates in the marketplace.259 But, law schools, allied with the academic
mission of their universities, “must at times give society, not what society wants,
but what it needs.”260 This Article proposes that legal education return to the
public good model, a regime that implicitly considers law schools’ clients to
include society and the legal profession, to which law professors can uniquely
contribute through legal scholarship. While teaching “spreads existing
knowledge [to] thirty or so students at a time,” 261 scholarship creates new
knowledge available to many, with the added benefit of potential lasting
systemic impact.
Yet, marketplace reformists, warped by consumerism, propose an academic
model aimed at reducing the cost of tuition that guts legal scholarship and
increases faculty teaching loads.
The marketplace regime’s proposed
curriculum for legal education represents what economists call the “tragedy of
the commons,” which is when a service or commodity important to society, such
as basic scientific research, is not financially supported by the private market.262
Legal scholarship may foster legal innovation and make important contributions
to our understanding of the legal system, yet no one in the marketplace—neither

257. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 468‒69 (1990).
258. See generally JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY, 12‒13 (I.T. Ker ed.,
1976).
259. SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 73, at 28‒29; see also Richard Moser, Overuse and
Abuse of Adjunct Faculty Members Threaten Core Academic Values, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan.
13, 2014), http://chronicle.com/article/OveruseAbuse-of-Adjuncts/143951/ (stating that the recent
“corporatization” and consumerism in higher education means that “[t]he search for truth, critical
thinking, intellectual creativity, academic standards, scientific invention, and the ideals of
citizenship have been discounted in favor of maximizing profits, vocational training, career success,
applied research, and bottom-line considerations”).
260. ABRAHAM FLEXNER, UNIVERSITIES: AMERICAN, ENGLISH, GERMAN 5 (Transaction
Publishers 1994) (1930).
261. James Lindgren, Fifty Ways to Promote Scholarship, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 126, 126 (1999)
(emphasis added); see Lindgren & Nagelberg, supra note 36, at 827‒29 (reporting results of a study
finding that professors whose scholarship is frequently cited in the literature are also more likely to
have significantly higher teaching evaluations).
262. See William H. Press, What’s So Special About Science (And How Much Should We Spend
on It?), 342 SCIENCE 817, 821 (2013), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/342/6160/8
17.full.pdf.
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law students, law firms, nor clients—are individually willing to pay for this
larger societal benefit. The 2013 ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal
Education noted the “constant, never fully resolvable tension” between the view
of the law school as a private good designed to serve the needs of consumers in
the legal marketplace and train lawyers for practice versus the broader view of
the law school as a public good with the mission to serve society263 by producing
scholarship and by training students, through a liberal arts education in the law,
to be “broad-based problem solvers and societal leaders.”264 But as discussed
below, these public goods will serve the private interest as well. As the ABA
Task Force noted, “[t]he traditional emphasis on legal education as a public good
has led to a focus on quality of legal education as an overriding goal by law
schools.”265
The case for decentering professors from scholarship stands as foreground
against the longstanding debate concerning the value of legal scholarship and
the appropriate role for law schools as either academic or vocational schools. In
1936, Professor Fred Rodell complained that legal scholarship was irrelevant to
law practice and public policy.266 The complaint that law professors write on
esoteric topics for themselves and each other267 is an old criticism268 that has

263. ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at 4‒5.
264. Id. at 12.
265. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
266. Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38, 42‒43 (1936).
267. Brent E. Newton, Law Review Scholarship in the Eyes of the Twenty-First-Century
Supreme Court Justices: An Empirical Analysis, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 399, 415 (stating that most
legal scholarship is simply “articles written by law professors for law professors, rather than for
members of the bench and bar”).
268. See id. (noting the same criticisms date back to the 1970s); see also, e.g., James W. Ely,
Jr., Through a Crystal Ball: Legal Education—Its Relation to the Bench, Bar, and Community, 21
TULSA L.J. 650, 654 (1986) (stating that law reviews are not useful to practitioners); John E.
Nowak, Woe Unto You, Law Reviews!, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 321 (1985) (claiming that only
academics read the law reviews, which only “decorate law school library shelves”).
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gained renewed potency among judges, 269 the bar, 270 and even some law
professors,271 just as it did during the 1990s when people were complaining that
professors were out of touch and did not teach students real-world skills. Legal
scholarship today is heavy on theory and interdisciplinarity (“law and . . .”), and
critics note that most law review articles are never cited or used by
practitioners.272 Yet, the same is true in most fields, where practitioners273 as
269. See Stephen G. Breyer, Response of Justice Stephen G. Breyer, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 33, 33 (2008) (stating that legal scholarship is increasingly irrelevant to the legal system
and that “law review articles have left terra firma to soar into outer space”); Harry T. Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 35
(1992) (observing that most legal scholarship is useless from his view on the bench of the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals); Judith S. Kaye, One Judge’s View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39
J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 320 (1989) (a New York Court of Appeals judge expressed her
“disappoint[ment] not to find more in the law reviews that is of value and pertinence to our cases .
. . . The concern that academics are writing for each other is indeed well founded”); Alex Kozinski,
Who Gives a Hoot About Legal Scholarship?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 295, 297, 318 (2000) (Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals judge’s criticism of law review articles as irrelevant to lawyers and judges); see
also Adam Liptak, The Lackluster Reviews that Lawyers Love to Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/us/law-scholarships-lackluster-reviews.html (quoting Chief
Justice John Roberts at a recent judicial conference, “[p]ick up a copy of any law review . . . [and
it] isn’t of much help to the bar”); Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding
Law Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
03/19/us/19bar.html?_r=0 (providing the opinion of several judges).
270. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 172, at 5 (positing that “[p]ractitioners tend to view
much academic scholarship as increasingly irrelevant to their day-to-day concerns”); Newton,
supra note 18, at 105, 114 (asserting that “law reviews publish approximately 150,000 to 190,000
pages per year. Yet the majority of those pages . . . provide little if any social utility (other than to
their authors) and represent a colossal amount of wasted resources and opportunity costs”).
271. See, e.g., David Hricik & Victoria S. Salzmann, Why There Should Be Fewer Articles Like
This One: Law Professors Should Write More for Legal Decision-Makers and Less for Themselves,
38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 761, 768 (2005) (stating that “[t]oo much of legal scholarship is becoming
‘law professor scholarship,’ a discourse among theorists with little practical application”).
272. See Gregory Scott Crespi, The Influence of Two Decades of Contract Law Scholarship on
Judicial Rulings: An Empirical Analysis, 57 SMU L. REV. 105, 117 (2004) (reporting results of
empirical study finding that “judicial citation of contract law scholarship is apparently rather
infrequent, with almost 70% of the predominately top-tier subset of contract law articles here
considered never having been cited by a single court,” and that “the average article considered in
this study was cited approximately 50 times more frequently by other scholars in law review articles
than it was in judicial opinions”); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by
Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659, 660 (1998) (finding that state and federal
appeals court citations to the top law reviews have dropped significantly in the last few decades);
Newton, supra note 267, at 416 (finding that the Supreme Court cites law review articles far less
frequently than in the past, with many of the articles cited not written by full-time law professors);
Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of
Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051, 1051‒53 (1991) (finding a low
percentage of law review citations); Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
309, 335 Fig.12, 336 (2007) (finding that forty-three percent of law review articles are never citied).
273. See Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1331‒32 (2002)
(discussing the rate of citations in the humanities and social sciences); Newton, supra note 18, 119‒
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well as policymakers274 ignore most of the scholarship. As Deborah L. Rhode
explained, however, “there is no system that can produce only good scholarship.
An academic culture that eliminates the bad scholarship will not provide a seedbed for the good.”275
Two recent empirical studies examining citations to legal scholarship by the
U.S. Supreme Court and Circuit Courts of Appeals, the most comprehensive and
methodologically sound studies to date, refute the notion that courts ignore legal
scholarship.276 Analyzing all Supreme Court decisions between 1949 to 2009,
Professors Lee Petherbridge and David L. Schwartz found: (a) the Court cited
legal scholarship in approximately one-third of its decisions; (b) the citation rate
had increased significantly over the years; and (c) citations to legal scholarship
often seemed to influence the Court’s decision or reasoning, with the Court most
often citing scholarship in difficult or important cases. 277 Professors
Petherbridge and Schwartz concluded: “we think the evidence reasonably leads
to an interpretation of the Court’s use of scholarship that is strongly contrary to
the claim that courts and practitioners have little use for it.”278 A similar study
of citations by the federal courts of appeals, analyzing 296,098 reported
decisions between 1950 and 2008, found that while only thirty-seven percent of
the opinions between 1950 and 1979 cited legal scholarship, sixty-three percent
of the opinions between 1980 and 2008 did so, a two-fold increase.279 Likewise,
a study of 200 business law opinions issued by the Delaware courts between
1997 and 2007 found no decline in their citation to law review articles. 280
Although the Delaware courts usually did not rest their holding on the scholarly
commentary, they did cite it more often in cases presenting novel or difficult
issues.281

22 (complaining that legal scholarship is too theoretical or interdisciplinary and citing many others
with the same complaint).
274. See, e.g., Beth McMurtie, Social Scientists Seek New Ways to Influence Public Policy,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 6, 2013, at A20‒21 (discussing the longstanding problem that
research by academic social scientists has often failed to impact policymaking).
275. Rhode, supra note 273, at 1331‒32.
276. See Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the Supreme
Court’s Use of Legal Scholarship, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1005 (2012); David L. Schwartz & Lee
Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 1345, 1359 (2011).
277. Petherbridge & Schwartz, supra note 276, at 1005‒08, 1012‒16.
278. Id. at 1016.
279. Schwartz & Petherbridge, supra note 276, at 1359‒61.
280. Michelle M. Harner & Jason A. Cantone, Is Legal Scholarship Out of Touch? An
Empirical Analysis of the Use of Scholarship in Business Cases, 19 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 5
(2011).
281. Id. at 25, 30, 48‒49 (finding, however, that the courts more frequently cited articles by
practitioners than articles by professors).
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Indeed, there are many instances where legal scholarship has significantly
altered the course of legal precedent or public policy; for example, Professor
Charles Reich’s scholarship that changed due process law through the Goldberg
v. Kelly282 decision;283 Professor Guido Calabresi’s impactful work on product
safety liability; 284 Professor Catharine MacKinnon’s scholarship helping to
establish sexual harassment law; 285 the “Chicago School’s” capturing of the
Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence; 286 Professor Paul Bator’s work on
federal habeas corpus jurisprudence; 287 and the influential work of Professor
Franklin E. Zimring and colleagues on the counterproductive effects of “gettough” juvenile justice policies. 288 More recently, Professor (now Senator)
Elizabeth Warren’s scholarship and associated advocacy on consumer financial
protection289 was chiefly responsible for the creation of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau.290
When courts fail to cite relevant scholarship, it may be because scholarly
commentary tends to articulate the ideal legal structure or doctrine, whereas
judges are constrained by precedent. Nevertheless, an ideal often informs the
possible, influencing jurists’ background perspectives and conceptual
frameworks for understanding legal problems.291 The thinking and practices of
lawyers, judges, and law clerks is influenced by what their professors (whose
thinking was molded by scholarship in their field) taught them in law school.
They also are influenced when they consult professors about cases and when
they hear professors talk at legal forums and continuing legal education

282. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
283. See Ronald A. Cass & Jack M. Beermann, Throwing Stones at the Mudbank: The Impact
of Scholarship on Administrative Law, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 9‒11 (1993).
284. See generally Guido Calabresi, “THE COST OF ACCIDENTS”: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 1‒16 (1970) (discussing five proposed reforms to product safety liability and providing
a thorough examination of the issues posed by the proposed reforms).
285. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).
286. See William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the
Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 1415‒17 (1990) (describing
the impact of the Chicago school’s view of antitrust on Supreme Court decisions).
287. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Foreword: Academic Influence on the Court, 98 VA. L. REV.
1189, 1193 n.20 (2012) (citing the influence of Professor Bator’s work on the law of habeas corpus).
288. Franklin E. Zimring & Stephen Rushin, Did Changes in Juvenile Sanctions Reduce
Juvenile Crime Rates? A Natural Experiment, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 57, 58‒59 (2013)
(summarizing their empirical findings).
289. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe At Any Rate, 5 DEMOCRACY J. 8, 16‒18 (Summer 2007),
available at http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/5/Warren.pdf.
290. Jackie Calmes & Sewell Chan, Obama Chooses Warren to set up Consumer Bureau, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2010, at B5.
291. Katyal, supra note 287, at 1190‒94 (describing the influence of scholarship on the
Supreme Court’s Affordable Care Act decision).
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workshops.292 A jurist’s perspective on constitutional law may be influenced by
critical theory learned in law school courses, a transactional attorney’s approach
to contract negotiation may be altered by exposure to the economic principles of
contract law, and a lawyer’s approach to counseling clients may be influenced
by learning about therapeutic jurisprudence or by reading The Trial293 or Bleak
House294 in a law and literature course. A lawyer’s thinking may even be shaped
by something quite esoteric, such as Professor David S. Caudill’s Lacanian
psychoanalysis of law, which changed my perspective on the legal system.295
Moreover, scholarship may have a greater impact on the development of
legislation and administrative regulations than it does on judicial decisionmaking. To be sure, while legislators and other policymakers virtually never
consult law review articles when drafting legislation,296 their staffs, legislative
task forces, and the law professors and other experts they consult may rely on
scholarship and scholarly opinion in various ways. For example, I served on a
Virginia task force appointed by the state legislature to study whether the
Commonwealth should adopt competency to stand trial standards or permit the
insanity defense in the juvenile court. At the outset, the task force consulted the
relevant legal and mental health scholarship on these issues, which substantially
influenced the task force’s recommendations.
Professors Hricik & Salzmann observe that in law practice they often faced
complex problems that could have benefited from scholarly, particularly
interdisciplinary, analysis of the kind that practitioners and judges have neither
the time nor expertise to conduct.297 When practitioners view legal scholarship
as irrelevant, as admittedly it often appears to be, perhaps it is not because their
legal education was too academic or that legal scholarship is, in fact,
irrelevant. Instead, the problem may be that law schools fail to educate students
on the ways in which scholarship can inform law practice.298 This leaves many
292. See Gary A. Munneke, Managing A Law Practice: What You Need to Learn in Law
School, 30 PACE L. REV. 1207, 1220 (2010).
293. KAFKA, supra note 151.
294. DICKENS, supra note 148.
295. See DAVID S. CAUDILL, LACAN AND THE SUBJECT OF LAW: TOWARD A
PSYCHOANALYTIC CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY at xi‒xv (1997).
296. See Cass & Beerman, supra note 283, at 4‒7 (noting some scholarly influence on
legislative decisions, but that such influence often occurs in relation to “broader issues that ha[ve]
permeated the popular realm . . . as to influence voting or at least the votes of active interest
groups”).
297. See Hricik & Salzmann, supra note 271, at 781.
298. See Sternlight, supra note 3, at 770‒71. Sternlight stated:
Academics . . . should cease making comments that lead students to see theory and
practice as conflicting with one another. Instead, academics should attempt to help
students see those disciplines as symbiotically supportive. . . . Too many academics,
consciously or not, encourage students to see legal practice . . . as an intellectual
wasteland. . . . [A]cademics also do a disservice to their theoretical scholarship when
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lawyers “not knowing what they don’t know”299 concerning the actual value of
legal theory as well as the social sciences, business sciences, and humanities to
what they do in practice. 300 This implies that their legal education was not
academic enough. The problem is compounded by the fact that law professors
often do not produce scholarship of the same quality as academics in other fields,
because law professors are the products of the same legal education as
practitioners, not having had the benefit of the scholarly training provided in
research-oriented graduate degree programs.301 Current reform proposals would
erode the rather modest extent to which law schools do provide scholarly
training, moving legal education back to a time when law school was trade
school and law professors were practitioners, who just taught what they knew
from their own limited practice experience and the casebooks they read.302
To be sure, however, much could be done to improve the quality and relevance
of legal scholarship. It suffers considerably because virtually everything written
is published somewhere sans the quality control found in the peer-reviewed
journals of other disciplines because would-be law professors receive little or no
scholarly training or preparation, and because most law schools have scholarship
standards for tenure (typically only three or four publications in non-peer
reviewed journals) below the quality and quantity standards of most other
academic disciplines.303
they fail to show students the relevance, and thus power, of their theories. Instead, too
often students accept the professors’ point that the worlds of practice and theory have
little in common and then go on to embrace the world of practice and reject the world of
theory.
Id.
299. Wendy L. Werner, DIY Professional Development, LAW PRACTICE MAGAZINE,
May/June 2013, available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/law_practice_magazine/20
13/may-june/career-steps.html.
300. See Edwards, supra note 118, at 2‒3.
301. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1321‒23
(2002).
302. See Bruce A. Kimball, The Principle, Politics, and Finances of Introducing Academic
Merit as the Standard for Hiring for “the Teaching of Law as a Career,” 1870‒1900, 31 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 617, 618 (2006) (contrasting the “traditional hiring standard of professional
experience and reputation” with the new “hiring standard of academic merit” emerging during the
end of the nineteenth century).
303. Professor Larry Rosenthal provides a touchstone example of the hazards of non-peerreviewed legal scholarship:
William Stuntz was one of the most prolific and cited criminal procedure scholars in
recent decades, but his work often contained broad empirical generalizations with
questionable empirical support—the kind of work that might be questioned by the editors
of a peer-reviewed criminology journal, but which law review editors were evidently
eager to publish, and legal scholars were subsebsequently [sic] eager to cite. For years
(really decades), the process of post-publication peer review described in this post
seemed to smile on Professor Stuntz’s claims—not because anyone systematically
examined the evidence supporting these claims, but because they offered support for
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Moreover, law professors often fail to fully consider the feasibility and
practical application of their theories in the real world. For example, when the
University of Pennsylvania Law School Professor Lani Guinier’s controversial
writings on voting rights were publically aired, President Clinton withdrew his
nomination of her to the post of Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights.304
Professors Guinier’s fate, postulates Mary Ann Glendon, may have been the
result, inter alia, of her fellow academic’s failure to scrutinize the real-world
implications of Guinier’s work. Consider also Berkeley Law School Professor
John Yoo’s “Torture Memo,” later widely criticized for providing misguided
legal advice, which provided the legal predicate for the enhanced interrogation
techniques of terrorist suspects utilized by the Bush Administration.305 Though
Professor Yoo was widely considered to be a “superstar” scholar,306 his lack of
practice experience may have left him ill-equipped to recognize the limits of his
innovative theories of executive power when applied in the real world.307
Legal scholarship must be of much higher quality and relevance. It must
explicate, rather than obscure, its practical relevance to law students, practicing
attorneys, and judges. Scholars should derive their theories from real-world
data, explain the links between theory and application, promulgate solutions

others who wished to make arguments that were supported by these same claims. In
other disciplines, however, empirical claims are not accepted merely because someone
has already made them—they require persuasive supporting evidence. In their recent
reviews of Professor Stuntz’s final book largely recapitulating Stuntz’s law review
articles, Stephen Schulhofer and Donald Dripps have dismantled a great many of Stuntz’s
central empirical claims. This is the kind of thing that rigorous peer review would be
more likely to catch.
Larry Rosenthal, Comments to Et Tu, Adam? The Lazy Critiques of Law Reviews Continue,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Oct. 21, 2013 9:42 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/10/ettu-adam-the-lazy-critiques-of-law-reviews-continues.html. Although introducing some form of
peer review into law reviews would likely improve overall quality, one should not be overly
sanguine about its benefits. Studies have documented bias in peer recommendations that often
reflects the reviewers’ theoretical and ideological bents, the unreliability of peer review, and the
lack of thoroughness in peer review. In addition, the peer-review process can produce long delays
between paper submission and publication, which is especially problematic for time-sensitive
topics. Finally, journal reviewers and editors sometimes reject papers they find too contrary to their
own views. See generally Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, Secretive and Subjective, Peer Review Proves
Resistant to Study, 341 SCIENCE 1331 (2013) (discussing poor peer-reviews); Carole J. Lee et al.,
Advances in Information Sciences: Bias in Peer Review, 64 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH.
2 (2013) (describing the different biases that exist in peer review); Richard Smith, Peer Review: A
Flawed Process at the Heart of Science and Journals, 99 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 178 (2006)
(describing the inefficiency, inconsistency, and bias of peer review).
304. Mary Ann Glendon, What’s Wrong with the Elite Law Schools, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1993,
at A16.
305. Lawrence Rosenthal, Those Who Can’t, Teach: What the Legal Career of John Yoo Tells
Us About Who Should Be Teaching Law, 80 MISS. L.J. 1563, 1563, 1566‒67 (2011).
306. Id. at 1564.
307. Id. at 1619‒25.
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having a realistic chance of real-world application, and write in a manner
accessible to non-academics.308
VI. TOO MANY LAW SCHOOLS, TOO MANY LAWYERS
Finally, an important step in improving students’ employment prospects,
while preserving the legal academy, is to reduce the over-supply of law schools.
The current glut of lawyers is the result of the late twentieth century boom in
law schools (we now have 204 ABA-accredited schools producing 44,000
graduates every year) 309 combined with the contraction in the legal services
market. 310 The profit motive has captured today’s universities, 311 which is
partly why we have an overabundance of law schools and law graduates unable
to secure employment. 312 Many law schools were established to brand their
universities as comprehensive institutions and to act as “cash cows,” because
law schools charge high tuition but have lower costs than most other professional
schools.313
I agree with critics that we need fewer law schools and smaller entering class
sizes.314 The alarming levels of student indebtedness, coupled with the inability
of recent graduates to find decent jobs or even a job utilizing their law degree,

308. Sternlight, supra note 3, at 768‒77.
309. ABA-Approved Law Schools, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/leg
al_education/resources/aba_approved_law_schools.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014); ABAApproved Law Schools by Year, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_educ
ation/resources/aba_approved_law_schools/by_year_approved.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
Twenty-four new law schools have received ABA accreditation just since 1990. See also Jerome
M. Organ, Legal Education and the Legal Profession: Convergence or Divergence?, 38 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 885, 900 n. 75 (2012).
310. Campos, supra note 1, at 212 (stating that “[a]s a percentage of gross domestic product,
the legal services sector in America has contracted by nearly one-third since the late 1970s”). In
addition to the pressures on law firms during the economic downturn, there has been a restructuring
of the legal services market. Online self-service vendors like Legal-Zoom allow customers to draft
their own simple legal documents without the services of an attorney, and major law firms are
increasingly utilizing non-lawyer services to perform paralegal-type functions. See RICHARD
SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 33‒39 (2008)
(arguing that legal services are evolving toward being standardized and prepackaged, thus requiring
far fewer lawyers).
311. See SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 73, at 17‒21, 25‒27 (describing the influence
of the corporate model on higher education).
312. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 145‒54 (describing unemployment statistics and how
they underestimate the number of unemployed law school graduates).
313. Howard B. Eisenberg, Mission, Marketing, and Academic Freedom in Today’s
Religiously Affiliated Law Schools: An Essay, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 7‒8 (1999).
314. See Campos, supra note 1, at 222 (stating that “law schools must become much less
expensive and produce far fewer graduates than they do now”).
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place enormous stress on students. 315 While the indebtedness problem is to
some extent overestimated,316 the lack of employment opportunities is not.317
For 2013 law school graduates, the ABA reports that only fifty-seven percent
secured employment that requires admission to the bar, 318 and the Bureau of
Labor Statistics “projects that [only] 47.6 percent of graduates of ABAaccredited law schools over the course of this decade will get legal jobs.”319
Not only are law schools producing too many lawyers, but they also are
producing too many bad ones, something we surely need not do given the glut
of attorneys. Yet, the admissions offices at many schools increasingly serve
more of a marketing than a selection function in this buyer’s market. Schools
must compete for students who are savvy consumers sensitive to comparative
tuition costs, scholarship availability, degree requirements, and schools’ job
placement success.320 To maintain the privileges of the privileged class, lowerranked schools in particular will matriculate students who lack the ability to
succeed in law school, pass the bar, land a decent job, or be effective lawyers.321
315. Inceptia Survey Reveals Financial Stress Taking Toll on College Students, INCEPTIA (July
26, 2012), http://www.inceptia.org/about/news/jul-26-2012. A recent national survey found that
loan indebtedness was the number one stress or for a large percentage of students, even more than
academics. Id.
316. See Campos, supra note 1, at 178, 204 (reasoning that the rising cost of legal education is
“not sustainable,” with students incurring “[d]ebts that [n]o [h]onest [m]an [c]an [p]ay”).
Assuming that the average combined undergraduate and law school debt of graduates is $130,000,
if students were to opt to repay their loans over a twenty-five-year periodm that amounts to monthly
payments of about $600, not much more than payments on a car loan. Though this imposes a
substantial burden on graduates whose average starting salary is only $60,000‒$70,000, their
salaries will increase substantially over the course of their careers and likely will not be the sole
source of family income. But see id. at 206 (estimating that the average debt of a 2016 law school
graduate will be $165,000, which amounts to a monthly payment of approximately $1,100).
317. See id. at 202 n.99, 210‒11 (reviewing employment data showing that in 2011‒12, only
fifty-eight percent of law graduates obtained jobs requiring a law degree and that many graduates
of elite schools did not secure desirable jobs). As one discouraged graduate put it:
I’m humiliated and demoralized. . . . I’ve resigned myself to the fact that I will never
have a career. I won’t have retirement savings. . . . I will continue to be immune to the
rejection letters I receive in response to the litany of resumes and cover letters I send out
daily. . . . I will be just another number in this generation of lawyers who will fall by the
wayside.
Id. at 178.
318. Paul Caron, ABA Releases “Bleak” Jobs Data for 2013 Law School Grads, TAX PROF
BLOG, (Apr. 10, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/04/aba-releases-.html.
319. Campos, supra note 1, at 213‒14 (citing data from the United States Department of
Labor).
320. See generally Jeffrey Selingo, Colleges Must Prepare for a Buyer’s Market, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 8, 2013), http://search.proquest.com/columbo.law.cua.edu/docview/1325038
908/fulltext/FE7C8DEC4A014119PQ/12?accountid=147762 (discussing college students being
more conscious about these factors).
321. The median LSAT score of incoming students is lower than it was several years ago at
half the law schools in the country. Sloan, supra note 2. Some argue that the lowest-ranked schools
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As Professor Daniel D. Barnhizer observed, “because we have admitted the
otherwise inadmissible, and because law school finances are dependent on
student tuition payments, we incur a high cost to ‘nurture’ those who are neither
particularly good students nor likely to become good lawyers no matter how
many skills courses through which we put them.”322
Additionally, we must confront the societal cost of producing so many
attorneys in terms of the unnecessary litigation and other kinds of “overlawyering” they must generate to keep themselves employed. We now have
over one million licensed attorneys in the United States, more than one for every
300 people (open the phone book and see the reams of pages devoted to lawyers,
more than any other service or profession). What our society needs, instead, is
more nurses, doctors, engineers, scientists, computer specialists, teachers, social
workers, and the like, yet schools are producing 44,000 law school graduates
every year (as compared to only 9,000 doctorates in the physical sciences, 8,000
in engineering, and 8,000 in the social sciences). We are falling behind other
nations in math and science, not in legal services, though we do not have enough
attorneys for underserved populations.
To address the systemic problem of too many schools producing too many
lawyers, reformers propose limiting the amount of federal student loan money
available to law schools (which currently receive over one billion dollars a
year)323 and tying loan money to performance measures such as affordability and
learning outcomes—with an emphasis on practical skills, bar passage rates, and
job placement.324 These measures would cause some law schools to close and
lead to smaller entering class sizes in others. Reducing federal aid money and
tying it to educational performance is a good way to reduce the glut of lawyers
and ensure educational quality. 325 Indeed, unlike the ABA, the AAMC has
effectively ensured that there is not a substantial over-supply of physicians by
keeping the number of medical schools to only 141326 and by requiring very high
standards for admission—higher than the standards of all but the most elite law
schools.327
serve the societal need of producing graduates who may be more likely to serve underserved
populations, yet clients are benefitted little if served by an incompetent or marginally-competent
attorney.
322. See Barnhizer, supra note 7, at 670.
323. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 179‒80; see also Newton, supra note 27, at 67‒68
(opining that the federal loan structure should be altered to provide law schools with a financial
incentive to admit a more reasonable number of students).
324. See Newton, supra note 27, at 67‒71.
325. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 180; Henderson, supra note 1, at 469‒70.
326. See Medical Schools, ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., https://www.aamc.org/about/medical
schools/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
327. See, e.g., MSAR: Getting Started, Medical School Admissions Requirements, ASS’N AM.
MED. CS. 7, 59 (2012); School of Medicine M.D. Admissions, Prerequisites and Requirements,
JOHN HOPKINS MED., http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/som/admissions/md/application_process/
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Furthermore, the quality of legal education would be improved if the U.S.
News rankings better reflected educational quality. Rankings are valuable in
holding schools accountable, providing information to consumers, and acting as
a sorting and signaling function for students and employers alike. 328 Law
schools’ obsession with their ranking drives certain priorities that trump more
appropriate academic considerations. 329 These rankings place too much
emphasis on factors that do not necessarily correlate with the quality, rigor, or
innovativeness of instruction, such as institutional wealth, peer reputation
(which is a self-fulfilling cycle; schools are rated highly by peers because of
their name recognition and because they are already highly ranked), and job
placement success.330
Not only has the profit motive captured universities and law schools, but law
professors as well.331 As Professor Tamanaha observes:
Our pay is far better than that of other professors in the university, and
we teach less than most professors. (And unlike professors generally,
who undergo a rigorous tenure process, tenure for law professors—
lifetime job security—is achieved with a relatively low quantity of
scholarly production and in practice is seldom denied.) Our quality of
life is far better than that of lawyers, and we make more money than
most lawyers.332
The average salary for tenure-track law professors is approximately $142,000
as compared to only $95,000 for professors in other disciplines. 333 “Star”
professors and those at elite law schools make much more, usually between
prerequisites_requirements.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
328. See Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, What Law Schools Can Learn from Billy Beane and the
Oakland Athletics, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1515‒17 (2004) (reviewing MICHAEL LEWIS,
MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2003)).
329. See Kenneth Lasson, Compelling Orthodoxy: Myth and Mystique in the Marketing of
Legal Education, 10 U.N.H. L. REV. 273, 275‒78 (2012) (pointing out the problems inherent in
trying to increase a school’s ranking).
330. Not only do some schools manipulate their job placement statistics, but it is also difficult
to equate placement statistics across schools that differ markedly in local economic conditions and
the percentage of their students opting for various types of legal and non-legal jobs. See Paul
Campos, Served, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/87251/lawschool-employment-harvard-yale-georgetown.
331. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 77‒78.
332. Id. at 52‒53. A colleague once remarked that law professors were the last of the
aristocracy. Hyperbole, but true when compared to professors elsewhere in the academy who are
paid substantially less and who usually have fewer perks in the way of travel, research budgets,
staff support and working environs and who are tenured at the associate rather than full professor
rank, yet have doctoral degrees and far greater scholarly expectations placed on them for tenure
and promotion.
333. Average Median Salaries of Tenured and Tenure-Track Faculty Members at 4-Year
Colleges, by Discipline and Rank, 2012‒13, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 23, 2013, at 7, available
at http://chronicle.texterity.com/almanac/201314almanac?sub_id=q2mohohy0qkG#pg1.
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$200,000 and $350,000.334 Law professors rationalize their salaries based on
what they could be making in practice, but as Professor Tamanaha suggests,
many law professors would not necessarily have the kinds of practices, or
success in practice, that would justify high salaries.335 In any case, the market
does not drive high salaries to attract lawyers to the professoriate, as the over
500 resumes submitted every year for the AALS faculty recruitment conference
demonstrate.336
Moreover, law professors’ salaries are difficult to justify when comparing
their credentials and productivity with that of other professors. Most academic
positions require an impressive publication record in peer-reviewed journals
before being hired on the tenure-track. Further, with the median time to
complete a Ph.D. program being almost eight years, doctoral degrees typically
take much longer to earn than a law degree. 337 This contrasts with the
requirements for being a law professor, which typically include only a threeyear, non-research degree338 and little scholarship before being hired—typically
only one or two publications in non-peer-reviewed law reviews.339 This does
not mean that law professors should be paid less, however, but only that
professors in other disciplines deserve to be paid more. In any event, the median

334. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 48‒49; Universities With Highest Average Pay for Full
Professors, 2012‒2013, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 23, 2013, at 7, available at
http://chronicle.texterity.com/almanac/201314almanac?sub_id=q2mohohy0qkG#pg1.
335. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 47.
336. See, e.g., Memorandum from Judith Areen, Exec. Dir. Ass’n Am. Law Schools, & Regina
Burch, Assoc. Dir. Ass’n Am. Law Schools, to the Council of the ABA Section on Legal Education
and Admission to the Bar (May 28, 2014).
337. Characteristics of Recipients of Research Doctorates, 2012, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Aug. 18, 2014), http://chronicle.com/articles/characteristics-of-Recipients/14732.
In an
embarrassing act of self-interested hubris, the ABA Section on Legal Education and Admissions to
the Bar simply proclaimed that the “Doctor of Jurisprudence degree . . . and the Doctor of
Philosophy degree . . . shall be considered as equivalent degrees for educational purposes.”
Roederick C. White, Sr., The Matrix Phenomenon: The Belief That the Lawyer Disciplinary System
is Designed to Give Lawyers Another Chance. Revisiting Penological Theory, 32 S.U. L. REV. 1,
4 n.8 (2004).
338. Although it usually is less demanding to earn a J.D. degree than it is to earn an M.D. or
Ph.D., those hired as tenure-track law professors typically were top-performing students from top
law schools. See Richard E. Redding, “Where Did You Go to Law School?” Gatekeeping for the
Professoriate and Its Implications for Legal Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 594, 599 (2003)
(reporting results of empirical study finding that eighty-six percent of all newly-hired law
professors graduated from a top-25 law school, one-third graduated from either Harvard or Yale,
and almost one-half served on the law review while in law school). Law professors have sterling
credentials, which is not a de facto requirement for other academics, where hiring decisions are
based primarily on the candidate’s scholarship and letters of recommendation.
339. See Brian Leiter, Why is it So Easy to Get Tenure in Law Schools?, LEITER REPORTS: A
PHIL. BLOG (June 24, 2004, 11:53 AM) http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2004/06/why_is_it_
so_ea.html.
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attorney salary of $114,300 340 is not, as Professor Tamanaha suggests, an
appropriate benchmark for law professors’ salaries341 given their cream-of-thecrop credentials. Few lawyers have the academic preparation, scholarly
creativity, or academic inclination to be a law professor. 342 Furthermore, I
would suggest that the teaching, scholarship, and pro bono professional service
of professors is a greater service to society than the work of many highly-paid
attorneys, who advance the parochial interests of individual clients that often are
not coextensive with society’s best interest.343
VII. CONCLUSION
The real crisis in legal education is not high tuition, student debt, or the poor
job market, all of which are very significant concerns. The crux of the problem
is law schools’ failure to prepare students for twenty-first century law practice,
which is more complex and interdisciplinary than ever before—a failure that in
turn leads to the under-employment of law school graduates.344 I agree with
Professor William Henderson that “[t]o justify our current price tag, a law degree
needs to be a transformative educational experience that confers personal and
professional benefits to students and positive external benefits to society in the
form of more capable leaders and problem solvers.”345 But current proposals to
reform legal education will both harm the legal profession and law students. A
two-year law degree focusing on nuts-and-bolts practice skills, as many are now
proposing, takes us back to a time in American legal education when law schools
were little more than vocational schools.
We must retain the three-year program of study but make it more robust: teach
the core subjects and applications of other disciplines relevant to everyday law
practice, expose students to a reasonable range of specialty areas, and integrate
skills training throughout the curriculum. To accomplish these goals, law
schools should adapt the medical school model to legal education. This would
entail a curriculum that provides a comprehensive foundation in basic legal
340. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2013,
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes231011.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2015).
341. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 47.
342. See Robin I. Mordfin, Students to Students: Teaching the Legal Academies Process, U.
CHI. L. SCH. (2013) http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/spring13/studentstoscholars
(Mar. 10, 2015).
343. See e.g., Determining Whether Legal Advice to Violate the Law Is Ethical, ARIZ. ST. L.J.
(June 13, 2011), http://arizonastatelawjournal.org/determining-whether-legal-advice-to-violatethe-law-is-ethical/. The free market is quite imperfect. There is often a difference between the
benefits work conveys on society and the value it commands in the market. Despite the market
imperfections, economists would balk at Professor Tamanaha’s inference that law professors are
overpaid in part because the professors have somehow formed an anti-competitive cartel. There are
over 200 accredited law schools that frequently compete against one another to offer sizeable tuition
discounts to their best applicants.
344. Henderson, supra note 1, at 461-62.
345. Id. at 465.

2015]

The Legal Academy Under Erasure

417

subjects and legally relevant other disciplines, culminating in a series of clinical
rotations where the basic doctrinal and interdisciplinary knowledge is applied in
practice. We also must not gut support for faculty scholarship in the hopes that
doing so will cut costs and encourage professors to focus on teaching practical
skills. Contrary to popular claims, engaged scholars are better teachers, and
legal scholarship contributes meaningfully and substantially to law practice and
reform. Finally, law schools must address the employment problem and
improve educational quality by producing fewer attorneys. We need fewer, but
better, law schools.
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